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Marbury and the Constitutional
Mind:  A Bicentennial Essay on the
Wages  of Doctrinal Tension
Richard H. Fallon, Jr.
Bicentennial celebrations of Marbury  v.  Madison  should recognize
Marbury's  influence in shaping a body of constitutional  law that is not only
rich and diverse but also tension-ridden. Marbury  furnishes the canonical
statement of the judicial  role, but that statement is multiple, not singular.
Specifically, Marbury  exhibits three distinct  faces. A  "private-rights"  face
asserts that courts must decide constitutional issues when,  but only when,
necessary to adjudicate traditional  disputes involving concrete injuries. A
"special-functions  "face implies that courts have a broader role in enforc-
ing constitutional  norms. A  "political" or "prudential  "face, which is sug-
gested  by  Marbury's  surrounding facts,  counsels  that  courts  should
sometimes tailor  their rulings to avoid collision with the political  branches.
Marbury's  three faces frequently yield conflicting prescriptions. What  is
more,  all help  to  shape contemporary constitutional law.  The  result is
widespread doctrinal tension. In  the literature on constitutional law and
theory, varied  strategies  have emerged  for dealing with the challenges and
cognitive dissonance that doctrinal tension generates. Some strategies  seek
to  establish doctrinal coherence through creative interpretation,  policy-
driven reform, or historical  reconstruction. Others attempt to explain and
disarm doctrinal conflict. But no  one strategy can satisfy all of the de-
mands for ordered  understanding  that a participant  in constitutional  prac-
tice  might  reasonably assert. Richness and diversity are  the glory  of
Marbury's  legacy, but tension and methodological disagreement are also
integral  to its heritage.
INTRODUCTION
This is  an  essay about tensions and  apparent  contradiction,  and about
strategies  for dealing with tensions and apparent  contradiction,  at the foun-
dations of constitutional  law. I begin with the assumption that most partici-
pants  in  constitutional  discourse  experience  it  as  including  doctrinal
tensions  that  sometimes  appear  to  devolve  into  outright  contradictions.'
1.  Legal  scholarship  abounds with  expressions of frustration  at the  "mess"  created  by doctrinal
tensions  and  contradictions.  See,  e.g.,  Akhil  Reed  Amar,  The  Future of Constitutional Criminal
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Commentators  sometimes,  attribute  doctrinal  tensions  to  the  distinctive
failures of the  Supreme  Court  during particular  eras.2  But the problem,  if
that  be the word,  is  more  foundational.  No  case  more aptly  demonstrates
deep-rooted  tensions in constitutional  law than Marbury v. Madison, 3  and I
shall treat Marbury and doctrines that trace to it as paradigmatic.
As Marbury's forthcoming bicentennial reminds  us, this  decision oc-
cupies  a unique status  in the constitutional  mind. If viewed  as the case es-
tablishing  judicial  review,  Marbury has  a  foundational,  even  constitutive
role  in  constitutional  jurisprudence.4  Take  away  Marbury, and  constitu-
tional  doctrine as  we know  it would  disappear.  As historians  have pointed
out,  the portrayal  of Marbury as  uniquely  or even  principally  responsible
for judicial review is probably simplistic,5 but even if the received teaching
Procedure,  33  AM.  CRIM.  L. REV.  1123,  1126  (1996)  ("[A]t the  level of Supreme  Court  doctrine ...
constitutional  criminal  procedure  is,  to  put  it  bluntly, a mess.");  Mitchell  N.  Berman,  Commercial
Speech  and the  Unconstitutional Conditions  Doctrine:  A Second Look at  "The  Greater  Includes  The
Lesser", 55  VAND.  L.  REV.  693,  763  (2002)  ("Existing commercial  speech doctrine  is a mess.");  John
C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983,  84  VA.  L.  REV.  47, 47  (1998)
("As  everyone  knows,  the  Eleventh  Amendment  is  a mess.");  William  Michael  Treanor,  Jam for
Justice  Holnes: Reassessing  the  Significance  of Mahon,  86  GEO.  L.J.  813,  871  (1998)  (noting
scholars'  general  agreement  that  the  doctrine  of  constitutional  takings  "incorporates  a  series  of
approaches  that,  as  has  been  often  pointed  out,  conflict  with  each  other  and  make  takings  law  a
'mess'). Justices of the Supreme  Court  also note  and decry  contradictions in  constitutional doctrine,
albeit rarely in opinions for the Court. See, e.g., Romano  v. Oklahoma,  512 U.S.  1,  6 (1994)  (describing
the  requirements  of Eighth Amendment  doctrine  in  death penalty cases  as  "somewhat  contradictory");
Church  of Lukumi  Babalu  Aye,  Inc.  v.  City  of Hialeah,  508  U.S.  520,  573-74  (1992)  (Souter,  J.,
concurring  in part and  concurring in  the judgment)  (arguing  that Employment Div. v.  Smith,  494 U.S.
872 (1990),  created an "intolerable  tension" in free-exercise doctrine).
2.  See,  e.g.,  ALEXANDER  M.  BICKEL,  THE  SUPREME  COURT  AND  THE  IDEA  OF  PROGRESS  81
(1970)  (criticizing "the  Warren  Court's refusal, too often, to submit to the discipline of the analytically
tenable  distinction, and ...  other failings of a like  character");  Vincent  Blasi,  The Rootless  Activism of
the  Burger  Court,  in  THE  BURGER  COURT:  THE  COUNTER  REVOLUTION  THAT  WASN'T  198-217
(Vincent  Blasi  ed.,  1983)  (discussing doctrinal  and  methodological  tensions arising  from the  "rootless
activism"  of the  Burger  Court);  Charles  Fried,  Revolutions?,  109  HARV.  L.  REV.  13,  76-77  (1995)
(suggesting  that the  Rehnquist Court  "may  be clearing away"  the "detritus"  left by the less  principled
Warren  and Burger Courts).
3.  5 U.S. (1 Cranch)  137 (1803).
4.  See, e.g.,  Cooper v. Aaron,  358 U.S.  1, 17-19  (1958)  ("This decision [Marbury]  declared the
basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme  in  the exposition of the law of the Constitution,  and
that  principle  has  ever  since  been  respected  by  this  Court  and  the  Country  as  a permanent  and
indispensable feature of our constitutional system.");  PAUL  W.  KAHN,  THE REIGN  OF  LAW:  MARBURY
V.  MADISON  AND  THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  AMERICA  4  (1997)  ("Marbury  is  a  canonical  text  of
constitutional  law"  with  which  "the  study  of constitutional  law"  both  begins  and  ends.);  Henry  P.
Monaghan,  Marbury  and the Administrative  State,  83  COLUM.  L. REV.  1, 7 (1983)  (terming  Marbury's
establishment  of  the  law-declaring  duty  of  the  judicial  branch  "a  cornerstone  of  the  American
constitutional order").
5.  At the Constitutional Convention, the delegates seem to  have taken for granted that the courts
would  have  a power of judicial review  of at least  some scope.  See  RICHARD  H.  FALLON,  JR.  ET  AL.,
HART  &  WECHSLER'S  THE  FEDERAL  COURTS  AND  THE  FEDERAL  SYSTEM  11  (4th ed.  1996). During  the
ratification  debates, Hamilton  defended such  a power in  Federalist No. 78.  See  The Federalist No. 78,
at  467  (A.  Hamilton)  (Clinton  Rossiter  ed.,  1961).  And  prior  to  Marbury,  as  David  Currie  has
emphasized,  the  Justices  had  either  exercised  or  presupposed  a power  of judicial review  in  several
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about Marbury is  part  myth, that  myth  has become  real  in  constitutional
doctrine  and  surrounding  practices  of argument.  Within  those  practices,
Marbury not only represents  the  fountainhead  of judicial  review,  but also
furnishes  the canonical  statement  of the  necessary  and  appropriate role  of
courts in the constitutional scheme.
I shall argue  in this Article,  however, that Marbury's canonical  state-
ment  is  multiple,  not singular,  in  its portrayal  of the judicial  function  in
constitutional  adjudication.  More  specifically,  the  mythic  Marbury that
suffuses constitutional jurisprudence has what  I shall characterize  as three
faces:  a private-rights  face,  a special-functions  face,  and a prudential  face.
These  three  faces  generate  prescriptions that  appear  to  contradict  one an-
other.
For anyone with an "internal" point of view on constitutional  practice,
reflecting  the  outlook  of  an  engaged  participant  in  constitutional  argu-
ment,6  tensions  in  constitutional  doctrine  are  likely  to  generate  the
The Supreme  Court itself had measured  a state  law against a state  constitution  in  Cooper v.
Telfair [4  U.S.  (4 DalI.)  14  (1800)]  and had struck  down another  under the supremacy  clause
in  Ware v.  Hylton [3  U.S.  (3 DalI.)  199 (1796)1;  in  both  cases  the power  of judicial  review
was  expressly  affirmed.  Even  Acts  of  Congress  had  been  struck  down  by  federal  circuit
courts, and the Supreme Court, while purporting  to reserve the question  of its power  to do so,
had  reviewed  the constitutionality  of a federal  statute  in  Hylton v.  United States  [3  U.S.  (3
DalI.)  171  (1796)].  Justice James  lredell  had explicitly asserted  this power both  in  Chisholm
v. Georgia [2  US. (2 DalI.)  419 (1793)]  and in  Calder  v. Bull [3  U.S. (3 DalI.)  386 (1798)],
and  Chase  had  acknowledged  it  in  Cooper....  Yet though  Marshall's  principal  arguments
echoed those of Hamilton  [in Federalist  No. 78],  he made  no mention of any of this material,
writing as if the question had never arisen before.
David Currie,  The Constitution in the Supreme Court:  The Powers of the Federal  Courts, 1801-1835,
49 U.  CHI.  L. REV.  646, 655-56  (1982).
It  has also  been  suggested that Marbury offered  no guidance  with  respect to  the most  important
question  about judicial review that actually  needed resolution:  Pursuant  to what standards could courts
hold acts of Congress  to be constitutionally invalid?  See ALEXANDER  BICKEL,  THE  LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH:  THE  SUPREME  COURT  AT  THE  BAR  OF POLITICS  73  (1962)  (noting  that Marbury is  premised
on the false assumption  that the Constitution gives "plain  and specific answers  to concrete  questions").
According  to Sylvia  Snowiss, "Marshall's  key innovations did not come  in Marbury," in which  he said
little about how the Constitution  should be interpreted, but  in opinions of the  1810s and  1820s in which
he  subjected  the  Constitution  to  "rules  for  statutory  interpretation"  and  "transformed  explicit
fundamental  law,  different  in  kind  from  ordinary  law,  into  supreme  written  law,  different  only  in
degree."  SYLVIA  SNOWISS,  JUDICIAL REVIEW  AND  THE  LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION  3-4 (1990).
6.  Engaged participants  include  not only judges and  lawyers,  but  also citizens  participating  in
constitutional  debate.  See J.M.  Balkin,  Understanding  Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and
the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103  YALE  L.J.  105,  128 (1993)  (noting that "there  are many different
types  of  'participants');  see also RONALD  DWORKIN,  LAW'S  EMPIRE  13-14  (1986)  (describing  an
internal  point of view  and contrasting  it  with  the  "external  point of view"  that  an anthropologist  or
historian  might  adopt  in  studying  a  remote  culture).  Dworkin's  distinction  between  internal  and
external  points of view, which I follow, reflects  an earlier, implicit distinction drawn by Herbert Hart in
maintaining  that  legal  and  social  rules  have  an  "internal  aspect"  in  addition  to  "the  regular  uniform
behaviour  which  an  observer  could  record."  HERBERT  LIONEL  ADOLPHUS  HART,  THE  CONCEPT  OF
LAW  55  (1961).  For  further  discussion  of  the  notion  of an  internal  point  of view,  see  infra text
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"inconsistency-produced  discomfort"  known  as  cognitive  dissonance.7
According  to the theory  of cognitive  dissonance,  "we  have,  built into  the
workings  of our mind, a mechanism  that creates  an uncomfortable  feeling
of dissonance,  or  lack  of harmony,  when  we  become  aware  of  some
inconsistency among the various  attitudes, beliefs, and items of knowledge
that constitute  our  mental  store."'  Cognitive  dissonance  is  likely  because
participants  in  constitutional  practice  are  generally  socialized  to  assume
that  legal  doctrine  is  action-guiding;9  it furnishes  binding  norms  of con-
duct.  This  assumption  underlies  doctrinally  based  arguments  about  how
courts ought to decide  cases,'"  and  it  provides  a necessary  foundation  for
criticism of officials'  conduct and judicial decisions. Doctrinal  tensions and
apparent  contradictions  threaten  this  assumption.  If competing  doctrinal
formulations  contradict one another, both cannot  supply premises  for valid
legal arguments  because  contradictory premises cannot both be true. When
participants  in  constitutional  argument  become  aware  of tensions  among
their  beliefs,  cognitive  dissonance  theory  holds  that the  resulting  discom-
fort  will  "motivate[]  us  to  seek  ways  to  resolve  contradictions  or
inconsistencies  among our cognitions.""
Focusing  on  doctrinal  tensions  traceable  to  Marbury v.  Madison, in
this Article  I shall  identify  a number of strategies  for dealing  with tensions
and apparent  contradiction  in constitutional  doctrine.  These  include what I
shall  describe  as  interpretivist,  reformist,  historicist,  realist, and  postmod-
emist  approaches..  Though  my  characterizations  are  somewhat  stylized,
each of these strategies reflects positions and assumptions familiar from the
literature,  even if my labels are  sometimes idiosyncratic.  Each strategy has
evident appeal.  But none,  I shall argue,  can satisfy all of the criteria  that a
reasonable  person might  apply  to  assess  strategies  for  responding  to ten-
sion and  apparent contradiction  in constitutional  doctrine. The  reason,  in a
7.  RITA  L. ATKINSON  ET  AL., INTRODUCTION  TO  PSYCHOLOGY 735  (1  1th ed. 1993).  For a subtle
and sophisticated exploration of how cognitive dissonance may affect efforts by law students and others
to understand legal doctrine, see  Balkin, supra note 6.
8.  PETER  GRAY,  PSYCHOLOGY  520 (4th ed.  2002).
9.  See  Marin Roger Scordato, The Dualist Model of  Legal Teaching and Scholarship,  37 AM.  U.
L. REV.  367, 389 (1990)  (noting that "law  professors  face powerful incentives  to present  legal doctrine
and legal  processes as being  fundamentally  rational,  coherent,  and consistent  with current notions  of
sound public policy" and that "law  students frequently carry with them into class powerful  assumptions
about the coherence, rationality, and substantiveness of legal rules  and legal  doctrine").
10.  See  RONALD  DWORKIN,  TAKING  RIGHTS  SERIOUSLY  279-90  (1977)  (arguing  that  legal
argument  and reasoning  presuppose  the existence  of a single "right"  and binding answer  even  to  the
most  controverted  legal  questions); Steven  D. Smith, Believing Like a Lawyer, 40  B.C.  L. REV.  1041,
1069  (1999)  (noting  that  the  "actual  practices  and  presuppositions  of lawyerly  arguments  seem  to
betray a  sort of faith in some metaphysical abstraction called  'the  law').
11.  GRAY,  supra note 8, at 520. The theory traces to LEON  FESTINGER,  A THEORY  OF  COGNITIVE
DISSONANCE  (1957).  Since its introduction, the theory  has  been  "one  of the most  influential theories  in
social  psychology."  Eddie  Harmon-Jones  &  Judson  Mills, An  Introduction  to  Cognitive Dissonance
Theoy and an Overview of  Current Perspectives on the Theory, in COGNITIVE  DISSONANCE:  PROGRESS
ON A PIVOTAL THEORY  IN  SOCIAL  PSYCHOLOGY 3 (Eddie  Harmon-Jones &  Judson Mills eds.,  1999).
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nutshell,  is that "the  problem"  presented by tension or apparent  contradic-
tion  is partly one of knowing how to carry on with constitutional  argument,
but also  partly one  of individual  psychology.  In response  to the  cognitive
dissonance  created  by  doctrinal  tension,  each  participant  in constitutional
practice  will need to reconstruct a reasonable harmony among her own be-
liefs. But different people  will  bring different beliefs  and purposes  to their
reconstructive  projects.  What counts as the best perspective from  which to
achieve  a reconstruction  will thus,  inevitably,  involve  variables  of purpose
and psychology as well as the strictures of intellectual rigor.
Upon discovering  tension at the foundation  of constitutional doctrine,
some  participants  in constitutional  argument  feel a  strong  impetus to iden-
tify an actual  or potential, even if hidden, doctrinal  harmony.'2 For them, it
would be  disturbing,  even repugnant,  to participate  in  a politically  impor-
tant practice  that pretends to  logical rigor 3 but frequently can  generate  no
conclusive  arguments
14  due  to  the  availability  of contradictory  premises.
For anyone who  experiences  this  psychological  reaction  yet wants to  con-
tinue  with constitutional  argument,  a perspective  on  doctrinal tension  will
not be  acceptable  unless  it promises  resolution  of apparent  contradiction.
But  there  are  various  ways  in  which  tension  might  be  removed,  either
through creative  interpretation  of existing doctrine  or through  systemic  or
doctrinal  reform.  Those committed  to the purging  of tension will predicta-
bly disagree among themselves  about how best to establish  harmony.
After an  initial  shock of cognitive  dissonance,  others  find  it easier  to
accept  that constitutional  practice  is tension-ridden  and  to participate  in it
nonetheless.  For example,  those  disposed  to  be deeply critical  of the pre-
vailing  legal  order  may  adopt  the  charge  of normative  incoherence  as  a
further  ground  for indictment. 5  Regarding  current  doctrine  as  conflicted,
they may participate in constitutional  practice with the aspiration of achiev-
ing reforms.  Or they  may  simply  seek  a  predictive  theory  of how judges
actually  decide  cases,  possibly  on  the  basis  of extradoctrinal  variables.
Other people,  sometimes characterized  as postmodernists, 6  believe contra-
diction  to  be  a  pervasive  feature  of contemporary  life  and  thought.  For
12.  See Balkin,  supra  note  6, at  146-50  (exploring  reasons  why  some people  "have  a personal
stake in the coherence of the legal system  or parts of the legal  system").
13.  See  DUNCAN  KENNEDY.  A CRITIQUE  OF  ADJUDICATION  (FIN  DE  SItCLE)  366 (1997)  (noting
that  law  students  !earn that the mode of speech appropriate  to adjudication  "presupposes  that there  is a
correct legal  answer to the question"  and that the discourse  answering this question is  "necessitarian");
Smith, supra note  10,  at  1042  (noting that  lawyers  and  judges  continue  to justify their  conclusions
virtually  exclusively  by  "purporting  to  extract  from  [a]  conglomeration  of  materials  univocal
conclusions about what 'the  law'  really  is").
14.  See  KENNEDY,  supra note  13,  at 311-12  (describing people  who  experience  loss  of faith  in
the power of legal  reasoning as similar to a loss of faith  in God).
15.  See  Balkin,  supra note  6,  at  150  (observing  that  people  who  find  "aspects  of  the  law
unjust ..  are likely to  find them lacking  in coherence as well").
16.  See infra text accompanying notes  258-73.
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them,  it may  be  possible to  assimilate  the acceptance  of irreducible  legal
tension to  their more  general  understanding  of language,  culture,  and  hu-
man personality.
Even  among  those  who  find  it  psychologically  easy  to  accept  doc-
trinal tension or contradiction, there remain incentives  for lawyers to argue
to courts, and for courts to respond, as if they believed that the tension was
only apparent, not real,  and that beneath the surface  lies  an immanent doc-
trinal order. To  say this is  only to recall  the initial  source of cognitive dis-
sonance:  Formal  constitutional  argument  characteristically  purports  to
move from  valid premises  to determinate  conclusions. But  it is possible  to
advance  constitutional  arguments  without  truly  believing  what  the  argu-
ments appear  to presuppose.  It is  also familiar  for participants  in constitu-
tional  discourse  to switch  their perspectives on doctrinal tension from time
to time  and  from  role  to role. A  realist  at one  moment,  who believes  that
judges are  free to choose how to decide  cases, may at the next moment of-
fer arguments,  in  a brief or before a  court, maintaining  that one position  is
constitutionally necessary.
In  light  of the  variety  of individual  psychological  responses  to  per-
ceived doctrinal tension,  there can  be no single,  demonstrably  correct way
to study,  understand,  or  attempt to  make  sense of constitutional  law.  The
resulting  diversity  of approaches  produces  what  can  be  viewed  either  as
remarkable  richness  or numbing  cacophony.  The  overarching  aim of this
Article is to shed light on this state of affairs.
The  argument  unfolds  as  follows.  Part I recites  the  familiar facts  of
Marbury v. Madison and discusses the case's foundational role  in constitu-
tional jurisprudence.  Part It then  argues that Marbury's canonical  charac-
terization  of  the  judicial  role  includes  a  private-rights  face,  a  special-
functions  face,  and  a  prudential  face,  each  reflected  in  current  constitu-
tional doctrine.  Part III argues that Marbury's three faces point in different
directions; they  offer conflicting  prescriptions  concerning  the judicial role
in implementing the Constitution. Part  IV develops the thesis  that tensions
and conflict at the foundations of constitutional  doctrine,  such as  those in-
troduced  by  Marbury, give  rise  to  cognitive  dissonance  and  a  resulting
search  for strategies to alleviate  it. Part IV sketches five leading  strategies.
It explains  the allure of each, but also argues that none can be proved supe-
rior to  the others by  conclusive  arguments  proceeding  from  shared prem-
ises.  Part  V  provides  a  brief conclusion,  asserting  that  the  upshot  of the
tension at the foundations of constitutional  doctrine  is diversity  in constitu-
tional  argument  and  outlook  as  well  as  irreducible  methodological  dis-
agreement.
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THE  STORY  OF MARBURY
For  nearly  all  students  of  the  judicial  role  under  the  American
Constitution,  Marbury marks  a  triumphant  beginning.17  History  has  wit-
nessed profound and  recurring  debates about how  the courts  should inter-
pret the Constitution and, in particular, about when they should hold acts of
Congress  unconstitutional. 8  But  it  seems  largely  undoubted  that judicial
review,  correctly  practiced,  is part of the  genius  of the  constitutional  or-
der.19
If judicial  review  is  widely  seen  as  successful,  Marbury's facts  are
almost irresistible  to  any narrator  of its history.2"  In the  early years of the
republic,  party  divisions  threatened  to  scuttle  the  nascent  experiment  in
national  government  under  a written constitution. After the  bitter election
of  1800,  the  defeated  lame-duck  Federalists  quickly  authorized  and  then
ratified the appointments of a wave  of "midnight" judges, virtually  all loy-
alists  of  their  defeated  party. 21  Also  in  high  dudgeon,  the  incoming
Jeffersonians  seemed  equally  prepared to  violate  the Constitution's  spirit,
if not  its  letter,  by  eliminating  judgeships22  and  impeaching  Federalist
judges at least partly for partisan reasons.23 In this charged atmosphere, the
Federalist  William Marbury  filed  suit in the Supreme  Court seeking  a writ
of mandamus  directing  James  Madison,  the  secretary  of state  in  the  re-
cently installed Jefferson administration, to tender him the commission as a
justice of the peace  that had somehow failed to be delivered to him during
the last days of the Adams administration.
17.  See, e.g.,  BICKEL, supra  note 5, at 74 ("Marbury v. Madison... exerts an enormous  magnetic
pull. It is,  after all, a great historic  event, a famous  victory; and it constitutes, even  more than victories
won by arms, one of the foundation stones  of the Republic. It is hallowed.").
18.  For  an  intellectual  history  of  American  constitutional  theory,  see  PAUL  W.  KAHN,
LEGITIMACY AND  HISTORY:  SELF-GOVERNMENT  IN AMERICAN  CONSTITUTIONAL  THEORY  (1992).
19.  See,  e.g.,  ROBERT  G.  MCCLOSKEY,  THE  AMERICAN  SUPREME  COURT  228-29  (1960)
(asserting  that  "surely  American  democracy  would  be  poorer"  without judicial  review).  There  are,
however,  important  recent  skeptical  treatments  of judicial  review.  See,  e.g.,  MARK  V.  TUSHNET,
TAKING  THE  CONSTITUTION  AWAY  FROM  THE  COURTS  (1999);  JEREMY  WALDRON,  LAW  AND
DISAGREEMENT (1999).
20.  For useful sketches  of Marbury's historical background  and context,  see RICHARD  E.  ELLIS,
THE JEFFERSONIAN  CRISIS:  COURTS  AND POLITICS  IN THE  YOUNG  REPUBLIC (1971);  KAHN, supra  note
4, at 9-17;  JAMES F.  SIMON,  WHAT KIND OF  NATION:  THOMAS  JEFFERSON,  JOHN  MARSHALL,  AND  THE
EPIC  STRUGGLE  TO  CREATE  A  UNITED  STATES  104-90  (2002);  1 CHARLES  WARREN,  THE  SUPREME
COURT  IN UNITED  STATES  HISTORY  155-230  (1922);  James  M. O'Fallon,  Marbury, 44  STAN.  L. REV.
219 (1992).
21.  See MCCLOSKEY, supra  note  19, at 39-41; SIMON, supra  note 20,  147-50,  173-74.
22.  The judgeships  were eliminated  by the Act of March  8, 1802, ch. 8, §  1, 2  Stat. 132, and the
repeal  act was allowed  to stand in Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S.  (I Cranch)  299 (1803),  decided just six days
after Marbury.
23.  See  SIMON,  supra note  20,  at  191-219  (describing  actual  and  threatened  impeachment
proceedings).
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With  politically motivated  expansions  and  contractions  of the federal
bench  and the prospect of politically driven  impeachments  already  menac-
ing  the  constitutional  aim  of an  independent,  nonpartisan,  and  co-equal
judiciary,  Marbury's  suit  against  Madison  threatened  to elicit  a knockout
blow.  If the  Supreme  Court  headed  by  the  newly  confirmed  Federalist
Chief Justice John Marshall ruled for Marbury, it was widely  expected that
Madison,  at Jefferson's  direction,  would ignore  the  decision.24 According
to  Marshall's  biographer,  "Jefferson  would  have  denounced the  illegality
of such  a  decision  and  laughed  at  the  court's  predicament."25  The  Court
would  have been  powerless  to enforce  its judgment, and  the precedent  of
executive  defiance  might  have diminished  the  Court irreparably.  If, how-
ever, the Court transparently  yielded  to the political  threat and  gave a  su-
pine  ruling for  Madison,  that precedent  would  also have  boded badly for
judicial independence.
With the role  of the  courts thus in the balance,  Marshall  ingeniously
engineered a decision that gave formal victory  to Madison, but rested on a
foundation  of judicial power, not impotence.  In a  performance  of stunning
bravura, Marshall  first established  that Marbury  had a right to his commis-
sion.26  He  then  coupled  an  inspiring  claim  about  the  commitment  of the
legal order to preserving private rights with an equally bold statement con-
ceming the  indispensable  role  of courts  in the  constitutional  scheme:  For
every  right, there must be a judicial remedy.27 Only  then did he undertake
to  extricate  himself from  the  looming  collision  with  reigning  political
forces.  He did so by holding that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction  to
grant Marbury the remedy to which he had a right. 2"
Marshall began  his jurisdictional  analysis by construing a provision  of
the  1789  Judiciary  Act29 as  attempting  to  confer  original  Supreme  Court
jurisdiction over all cases,  such as Marbury's, in which the plaintiff sought
a writ of mandamus.3" Marshall  then reasoned that this attempted  conferral
created  a constitutional  issue. By  design,  the Supreme  Court  is  almost ex-
clusively  an  appellate  court,  structured  to  review  the  decisions  of lower
courts.  In  only  a  few  categories  of  cases  does  the  Constitution  state
24.  See  Dean  Alfange,  Jr.,  Marbury  v.  Madison  and  Original  Understandings  of Judicial
Review:  In Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993  SuP. CT.  REV. 329, 383.
25.  3 ALBERT  J.  BEVERIDGE,  THE  LIFE  OF  JOHN  MARSHALL:  CONFLICT  AND  CONSTRUCTION,
1800-1815,  at  127 (1919).
26.  Marbury  v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)  137,  162 (1803).
27.  Id.  at  163.
28.  Id. at 176-80.
29.  Act of September 24,  1789,  I Stat. 73  (1845).
30.  See Marbury, 5  U.S. at  173  (finding  that  the  case  comes  within  the  provision  of the  1789
Judiciary Act authorizing the Supreme Court  to issue writs of  mandamus).
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expressly that the Supreme Court may function as a trial court.3  Marbury's
suit aglinst Madison did not come within any of those categories. And  the
listed categories, Marshall ruled, were  intended to be exclusive.
Within Marshall's intricate frame, the dispositive question in Marbury
thus  became  whether  a  congressionally  enacted  statute  could  bind  the
Supreme  Court to exercise  a jurisdiction  forbidden  by the  Constitution.  It
was only by giving  a negative  answer to this  question, and thereby  claim-
ing authority  to engage in judicial  review of the constitutionality of acts of
Congress,  that  the  Court  could  rule  against  Marbury  and  in  favor  of
Madison.
By  framing  and  resolving  the  issues  as  he  did,  Marshall  turned
Marbury v. Madison into an enormous strategic victory  for judicial power.
By  squarely  placing  the  holding  on the ground  that the  Constitution  for-
bade  Supreme Court jurisdiction, he  set  an enduring  precedent of judicial
review.  But because  Marbury  received  no  remedy,  there  was  no judicial
command to the executive branch  for Madison to defy or for  opponents of
judicial power to denounce.
Marbury's dramatic  facts  explain  the  case's  capacity  to  enthrall  stu-
dents of history, but the decision holds a further power for students of law.
Within the fields of constitutional  law and  federal  courts  law, Marbury is
not merely  a  case  of historical  importance,  but  a  living  paradigm  of the
necessary  and proper function of courts in exercising judicial  review.32 For
contemporary judges,  lawyers,  law professors,  and  law  students, Marbury
epitomizes the role  that the judicial branch can,  should, and must play un-
der the American  Constitution.  In doing  so,  it structures  traditional  think-
ing about the judicial function.
To be a constitutional lawyer is to participate  in a practice that is sub-
stantially  founded  on Marbury. 33  There  is  no stronger constitutional  argu-
ment against a position than that it contravenes Marbury's central holding;
Marbury is too foundational,  too ensconced,  and too pervasive  in influence
to be rejected  as mistaken.34  Correspondingly,  perhaps  the strongest  argu-
ment  of  principle  in  favor  of  a  disputed  constitutional  position  is  that
Marbury entails it. Again, the rejection of Marbury is unthinkable.  Instead,
31.  See  U.S.  CONST.  art.  III,  §  2,  cl.  2  ("In  all  Cases  affecting  Ambassadors,  other  public
Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the Supreme Court shall  have original
Jurisdiction.").
32.  See KAHN,  supra note 4,  at 4  (observing that "Marbury's world has become a common world
for most of us, most of the time"); Monaghan, supra  note 4, at 8 (terming Marbury "our most important
decision").
33.  See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 5, at 74; KAHN,  supra note 4, at 4.
34.  See, e.g.,  Coll.  Say.  Bank  v. Fla.  Prepaid  Postsecondary  Educ.  Expense  Bd.,  527  U.S.  666,
688 (1999)  (noting that  "debate  over whether Marbury v. Madison ...  was wrongly decided"  has been
consigned  by  tradition  and experience  "to  forums  more other-worldly  than  ours"). But cf  Myers  v.
United States, 272 U.S.  52 (1926)  (disapproving of Marbury's holding that  Congress can prescribe  the
terms of office and conditions for presidential  removal of executive officials).
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constitutional  lawyers  must understand  Marbury, or interpret  it,  or make
sense of its implications.  To understand  Marbury is to understand the prac-
tice of constitutional  law,  or at  least the judicial role;35 and  to understand
our constitutional  practice  is to understand Marbury.  The two are too much
interconnected  in  the  constitutional  mind  for  a  perception  of one  not  to
color,  or  indeed  sometimes  determine,  an understanding  of the  other. As
Paul  Kahn  has written,  "The  study  of constitutional  law  not only  begins
with this case,  it ends  there as  well,"  in debates  about judicial review  and
the appropriate judicial role.36
II
MARBURY's  THREE  FACES
Marbury can exert its extraordinary  hold on the constitutional  mind in
part  because  of its  remarkable,  multifaceted  richness.  More  particularly,
John Marshall's  canonical  opinion includes  at least three facets  or faces. It
could plausibly be claimed that any of these reflects  an essential element of
Marshall's  reasoning  and  expresses  the  foundational  insights  that  subse-
quent judicial practice must follow  in order to be true  to Marbury. In  later
Sections of this Article, I shall discuss the tensions among Marbury's three
faces  and  consider  whether  those  tensions  lapse  into  contradiction.  For
now, I mean only to emphasize  the rich, textured, multifaceted  character of
Marbury and  to  suggest  how  Marbury's three  faces  help  to  support  an
equally  rich,  textured,  and multifaceted,  but also tension-ridden,  constitu-
tional practice.
A.  The Three Faces  Emerging  from Marbury's Reasoning
Marbury's divergent faces emerge partly from a parsing of the Court's
opinion,  as  refracted  through  subsequent  argumentation  and judicial prac-
tice,  and partly from attention to the surrounding  political context.
1.  The Private-Rights  Face
Judicial review  gives federal judges, who are  not directly  accountable
to the electorate,  a power that is potentially threatening  to more representa-
tive  branches  of government  and to political  democracy.37 Marbury's pri-
vate-rights  face  responds  directly to  this  threat  and  attempts  to  disarm  it.
This face represents Marbury as a species of traditional private litigation. It
35.  See ERWIN  CHEMERINSKY,  FEDERAL  JURISDICTION  13 (3d ed. 1999) ("John Marshall  ...  used
the  occasion  of deciding Marbury... to  articulate  a role for  the  federal  courts that  survives to  this
day.").
36.  KAHN, supra  note 4, at 4.
37.  For  a classic statement of this concern,  see James Bradley Thayer,  The Origin and Scope of
the American Doctrine of  Constitutional  Law, 7 HARV.  L. REV.  129 (1893).
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casts  the  Justices  of the Supreme  Court  as  ordinary judges  humbly doing
their best to apply the law to disputes between individuals.38
In Marbury, the Justices claimed no general  authority  to resolve con-
stitutional issues that might arise in American  politics. 39 Rather, Marshall's
reasoning grounds the Court's exercise of judicial review  in its need to de-
cide the case before  it, which involved  Marbury's claimed right to judicial
relief under the law of the United States.4"  To adjudicate Marbury's  claim,
the  Court  necessarily  had  to  consider  all  applicable  law,  including  the
Constitution  as  the  supreme  law.4'  In  adopting  the  Constitution  of  the
United States, "the People"  had worked an innovation by establishing legal
norms  with  which  ordinary  legislation  might  conflict. 2  But this  face  of
Marbury denies that the people had otherwise  altered the judicial role. That
role remained one of simply ascertaining the applicable law as necessary  to
resolve  otherwise  traditional  cases  involving  one  party's  claims  of right
against another.43
Marbury's private-rights  face  suffuses  and  inspires  what  has  been
called  "the  private  rights  model"  of constitutional  adjudication.44 Within
this model, courts have no warrant to decide constitutional issues except as
necessary  to  adjudicate  a  concrete  dispute.4 5  As  Marshall  asserted,  "The
province  of the  court  is,  solely,  to  decide  on the  rights of individuals. 6
The private-rights  model  also generates  a symmetrical obligation:  When a
constitutional  issue  arises within a  traditionally  framed case  and  is neces-
sary  to  the  determination  of private  rights,  courts  have  no  discretion  to
38.  See  Monaghan,  supra note  4,  at  12  ("Marshall  simply  extrapolates  the  judicial  role  in
constitutional  cases  from  the  'ordinary  and  humble  judicial  duty'  in  conventional  cases."  (quoting
Thayer, supra note 37, at 138)).
39.  See Marbury v.  Madison, 5  U.S.  (1 Cranch)  137,  170  (1803)  ("The  province  of the  court is,
solely, to decide on the rights of individuals  .... ").
40.  See  CHARLES  ALAN WRIGHT  &  MARY  KAY KANE,  LAW  OF  FEDERAL  COURTs  62  (6th  ed.
2002)  ("In  Marbury v.  Madison  it was central  to Chief Justice  Marshall's  argument  that  a court  has
power  to declare  a statute unconstitutional  only as  a consequence  of the power of the court to decide a
case properly before it.") (footnote  omitted).
41.  See Marbury, 5  U.S.  at  178  (noting that  if  both the  Constitution  and  a  purported  law  in
violation  of the  Constitution "apply  to a  particular case,  . . . the  court must determine  which  of these
conflicting rules governs the case").
42.  See  id  at  176  (noting that "the  people"  had  exercised  an "original  right"  to  establish  the
Constitution  as "fundamental"  law).
43.  See id. at  170  (concluding that Secretary of State Madison's position could not "exempt him
from this particular mode of deciding on  the legality of his conduct,  if the case be such a case  as would,
were any other individual the party complained of, authorize the process").
44.  See  FALLON  ET  AL.,  supra  note  5,  at  78-79;  Henry  P.  Monaghan,  Constitutional
Adjudication: The  Who  and When,  82  YALE  L.J.  1363,  1365-66  (1973)  (outlining  the  private-rights
model and tracing it to Marbury).
45.  See Marbury, 5  U.S.  at  170;  Monaghan, supra note  44,  at  1366  (observing that "Marbury's
analogy of constitutional  litigation  to  'ordinary'  common  law  litigation  strongly  suggested  that  the
occasions  for judicial  review  were  limited  to  the  protection  of  identifiable  and  concrete  personal
rights").
46.  Marbury, 5  U.S. at 170.
2003]CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
avoid  the issue or to decline to enforce  constitutional  rights. 47 Marshall  fa-
mously  intoned in Marbury  that for every right there must be a remedy and
that,  if this were  not  so,  the governmental  framework  would  cease  to be
one of laws and not of men. 8
2.  The Special-Functions  Face
In justifying the Court's exercise  of judicial review, Marbury asserted
that "it  is emphatically  the province  and duty of the judicial  department to
say what the law is."49  The  force of this proposition  can be seen as  condi-
tioned by the case's facts,  involving a concrete and traditional  claim of in-
dividual  right, 5"  but acceptance  of this  limit is not strictly necessary. 5  The
grounds  for  a broader  view  lie  in  Marbury's expressly  functional  argu-
ment:  If other branches of government,  especially Congress,  could exceed
constitutional  bounds without being subject  to judicial  check,  then  the re-
straining  function of a written constitution would be obliterated. 2
Marbury's argument  on  this  point  is  not wholly  complete.  Without
further  elaboration,  Marshall's  reasoning  invites  a  symmetrical  objec-
tion:  Judicial review, which implies judicial finality, merely substitutes the
Supreme  Court  for  Congress  as  the  institution  permitted  to  overstep  its
constitutional  powers.5 3 Attempting to  fill the argumentative  gap, champi-
ons of judicial review  have maintained  that a  life-tenured  Supreme  Court,
thus freed  from the pressures of partisan  politics, has a special capacity  that
political  officials  typically  do  not possess  for  conducting  a  long-sighted,
disinterested  analysis  of constitutional  issues."  If the premise  is  granted
47.  See Richard  S.  Kay,  Constitutional  Cultures, Constitutional  Law, 57  U.  CHI.  L.  REV.  311,
323 (1990).  Kay asserts  that
a corollary  to Marshall's  holding  in  Marbury that  the Constitution  is  enforceable  law is  his
dictum  in Cohens v.  Virginia [19  U.S. (6  Wheat.)  264, 404  (1821)]  on the  duty of courts to
adjudicate:  ...  "We  have  no  more  right  to decline  the  exercise  of a jurisdiction  which  is
given,  than to  usurp  that  which  is  not given. The  one or  the other  would  be treason  to  the
Constitution."
Id.
48.  Marbury,  5 U.S. at  163.
49.  Id. at  177.
50.  Indeed,  the very  next sentence  in Marshall's opinion  can  be read to link  the judiciary's  law-
declaring  powers  to the  necessity  of deciding  cases:  "Those  who  apply  the  rule  to particular  cases,
must of necessity expound  and interpret that rule." Id.  at  177.
51.  See, e.g., DAVID  P. CURRIE,  FEDERAL  COURTS  7-8 (4th ed. 1990) (noting that certain passages
in Marbury "suggest  that  Marshall  viewed judicial  review"  not as  "an  incidental  consequence  of the
courts'  basic job of deciding particular cases,"  but "as  an instrument  for keeping  the Congress within
constitutional  bounds,  a vital  element  in  the  system of checks and  balances");  Monaghan,  supra note
44, at  1370 (noting the potentially  broader implications  of Marshall's premises).
52.  See  Marbury, 5  U.S.  at  178  (asserting  that  if judicial  review  were  not  contemplated,  the
Constitution "would be giving to the legislature  a practical  and real omnipotence,  with the same  breath
which  professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits").
53.  See BICKEL, supra note 5,  at 3-4.
54.  See, e.g.,  id. at 25  (asserting that  "courts  have certain  capacities  for dealing with matters  of
principle  that legislatures and executives do  not possess"); MCCLOSKEY,  supra note 19,  at 229 (terming
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that  the  Court  has  a  special  and  needed  capacity  to  render  long-sighted
constitutional  judgments,  the  constraints  imposed  by  the  private-rights
model may  look ill designed. According  to what has been called a "special
functions"  or "public  rights" model,55 the courts should provide  safeguards
against  constitutional  violations  by  other  branches,  even  in  cases  that do
not involve  the kinds  of private rights  and  material  injuries  that  typically
underlie suits at common law. This model holds  that there is a public  inter-
est, appropriately  enforced through public-rights  litigation,  in ensuring  of-
ficial  conformity to legal  and especially constitutional norms.56 Champions
of a special-functions  approach  have also asserted  a related claim that  the
articulation  of constitutional  norms  is a  general  public  good,  partly  inde-
pendent of the need to remedy particular wrongdoing. 7
At least  with  the benefit  of hindsight,  it is  easy  to  trace  the special-
functions  model  to  Marbury 8  As Henry  Monaghan  has  noted,  Marbury
the judiciary  "the one governmental  element  disposed by its nature  to take the long  run into account").
According to McCloskey,  "An  impulsive  nation  like  ours, much given  to short-run  fads,  enthusiasms
and rages, can little afford to dispense  with the one governmental  element  that is disposed by  its nature
to take the long-run  into account."  MCCLOSKEY,  supra  note  19, at 228-29.
55.  See  Monaghan,  supra note  44,  at  1371-75  (defining  the  model);  see also  FALLON  ET  AL.,
supra note  5, at  79-80  (citing  Monaghan,  among  others,  in  identifying  a  "public  rights"  or  special-
functions model contrasting with a "dispute resolution"  or "private rights" model).
56.  "[A]t  least three ...  historical phenomena  have contributed  to the emergence" of the  special-
functions or public-rights  model:
The first involves  the vast  increase in  governmental  regulation, especially when administered
by  administrative  agencies,  that  has  created  diffuse  rights  shared by  large  groups and  new
legal  relationships  that  are  hard  to  capture  in  traditional,  private  law  terms ....  A  second
factor..,  has  been  the  substantive  expansion  of constitutional  rights,  especially  under  the
Warren Court in the  1960s.  For example, the broadly shared  interests of voters in challenging
a malapportioned  legislative district,  see Baker  v. Carr, 369  U.S.  186 (1962),...  or of public
school  pupils  in  challenging  school  prayer,  see  School  Dist.  v.  Schempp,  374  U.S.  203
(1963),  differ  markedly  from  the  liberty  and  economic  interests  recognized  at  common
law....  Third,  there  has  emerged  an  increasingly  pervasive  conception  of  constitutional
rights  not as shields  against governmental  coercion,  but as  swords  authorizing  the award  of
affirmative  relief to redress  injury to constitutionally protected interests.
FALLON ET  AL., supra note 5, at 80-81.
57.  For a celebration of this approach  and an assertion  of its primacy, see  Owen Fiss, The Forms
of  Justice,  93  HARV.  L. REV.  1, 30 (1979)  (asserting that "the function of the judge-a statement of the
social purpose  and a definition of role-is not to resolve disputes, but to give the proper meaning to our
public  values"). See also Susan  Bandes,  The  Idea of a Case, 42  STAN.  L.  REV.  227,  281-92  (1990)
(arguing  that  federal  courts  should identify  justiciable  cases  in  awareness  of the  public  benefits  of
judicial  interpretation  and  enforcement of the  Constitution);  Abram  Chayes,  The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation, 89  HARV.  L.  REV.  1281  (1976)  (noting  ways  in  which  public  law  litigation
frequently departs  from the  traditional private  law model and assessing the  appropriate judicial role in
public actions).
58.  For  an  explicit statement  of the  linkage,  see  Cooper v. Aaron, 358  U.S.  1, 17-19  (1958),  in
which the  Court  famously  asserted  that under Marbury, principles  once  enunciated  by  the  Supreme
Court were binding  on all  public  officials, including  those not party to the case  triggering the Court's
pronouncement:
Article  VI  of the  Constitution  makes  the  Constitution  the  "supreme  Law  of the  Land."  In
1803,  Chief Justice Marshall,  speaking for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution  as
"the  fundamental  and paramount  law of the nation,"  declared in the notable case of Marbury
v.  Madison, I Cranch  137,  177,  that "It  is emphatically  the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is."  This decision declared the basic  principle  that the federalCALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 91:1
"weld[s] judicial review to the political axiom of limited government" and
thereby  "provides  the  basis"  for  a  special-functions  approach.5 9 What  is
more,  important  strands  in Marbury appear  to reject  the insistence  of the
private-rights  model  that  constitutional  issues  should  be  decided  only  as
strictly  necessary.  In pronouncements  that turned out to be  quite unneces-
sary  in view of the ultimate dismissal of the case on jurisdictional grounds,
Marshall began by concluding  generally that for every right, there must be
a  remedy6"  and that the courts,  in furnishing  legally appropriate  remedies,
may compel the performance  of legal duties by high governmental officials
including  the secretary  of state.61 These pronouncements  reflect Marbury's
special-functions  face.62
3.  The Political  or Prudential  Face
Marbury's third  face  becomes  visible  when  one  looks  beneath  the
Court's rhetoric and considers the decision in its political context. This is a
judiciary  is supreme  in  the  exposition  of the  law of the Constitution,  and that principle  has
ever  since  been  respected  by  this Court  and the  Country  as a  permanent and  indispensable
feature  of  our  constitutional  system.  It  follows  that  the  interpretation  of  the  Fourteenth
Amendment  enunciated  by this  Court in  the Brown case  is the  supreme law of the  land,  and
Art.  VI  of  the  Constitution  makes  it  of  binding  effect  on  the  States  "any  Thing  in  the
Constitution  or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."  Every state legislator and
executive  and judicial officer  is solemnly  committed by oath  taken pursuant to Art. VI, cl.  3,
"to support this Constitution."
ld. at 18.
59.  Monaghan, supra  note 44, at 1370.
60.  Marbury  v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch)  137,  163 (1803).
61.  Id. at  169-73.  William  Van  Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury  v.  Madison,  1969  DUKE
L.J.  1, 6-8  (1969),  advances  an  ingenious but ultimately unpersuasive  defense of Marshall's  approach
that  is  consistent with  the private-rights  model. According  to Van  Alstyne, a determination  either that
Marbury  had  no  right  to  a  remedy  or that  mandamus  could  not  issue against  the  Secretary  of State
would  have  enabled  the  Court  to avoid  the  constitutional  question  whether  Section  13  of the  1789
Judiciary  Act effected a valid grant  of original Supreme  Court jurisdiction.  As Van Alstyne recognizes,
however,  in  the absence of jurisdiction the  Court would have  no authority to decide  issues unrelated  to
the determination  of its own jurisdiction.  See id. at 7; see also Steel Co.  v. Citizens  for a Better Env't,
523  U.S.  83,  101  (1998)  (holding  that  courts  must decide jurisdictional  issues  at  the  outset  and  that
pronouncements  on  other  issues  in  the absence  of jurisdiction  would  produce  "nothing  more  than  a
hypothetical  judgment-which  comes  to  the  same  thing as  an advisory  opinion"). According  to  Van
Alstyne,  the  question  whether  Marbury  had  a  right  to his  commission,  as  an aspect  of the  question
whether  Marbury had a claim  for which  Madison could be answerable  in court in  his official  capacity,
is  "an  issue respecting  'jurisdiction."'  Van  Alstyne, supra at  8. But  this is  a bridge too far;  it wholly
obliterates  the distinction between jurisdictional and merits  issues in  every case involving  a claim  that
the defendant  is not amenable to suit, either generally or on the facts of the case.
62.  See Desist  v.  United  States,  394  U.S.  244,  256  (1969)  (Douglas,  J.,  dissenting)  (observing
that  the  "tradition"  of  "producing  only  dictum  through  a  'case  or  controversy'  .. . started  with
Marbury"); Webster v.  Reprod.  Health  Servs.,  492  U.S.  490  (1992)  (Scalia,  J.,  concurring).  Justice
Scalia stated:
I have  not  identified  with  certainty  the  first  instance  of our  deciding  a  case  on  broader
constitutional  grounds than  absolutely necessary, but it  is assuredly  no later  than Marbury v.
Madison, where  we held that  mandamus  could constitutionally  issue against the  Secretary of
State, although  that was unnecessary  given our holding  that the  law authorizing the  issuance
of mandamus by  this court was unconstitutional.
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political face  of judicial prudence  tinctured with guile. Its central prescrip-
tion is that the Court must  sometimes recede  from conflict with the politi-
cal branches or with aroused public opinion in order to maintain  its prestige
and thus its power.
As  the  facts  surrounding  Marbury illustrate,  the  authority  of  the
Supreme Court is not self-enforcing.  To sustain and legitimate its place  in a
constitutional democracy,  the Court must define  for itself a democratically
acceptable  role. The  sources of the Court's vulnerability  are  several.  First,
the Court's orders are not self-executing.  Unless the Court maintains public
esteem,  outright defiance by political  officials  is by no means unthinkable.
Thomas  Jefferson  and  James  Madison  seemed  poised  to  ignore  the
Supreme  Court's  writ of mandamus  if one  had  issued in  Marbury. 63  If a
pattern of defiance  developed, the Court would be relegated to the margins
of constitutional  significance.  Second,  Article III  vests  Congress with  ex-
press  power to  control  and limit  the appellate jurisdiction  of the Supreme
Court.'  Although  the  constitutional  boundaries  of this  power  are  largely
untested,65 the scope  is probably broad enough  for the political branches to
rebuff the Court and  undermine  its stature.66  Third,  the political  branches
possess  constitutional  authority  not only to  determine  the  membership  of
the  Supreme  Court  through  appointment  and  confirmation  processes,  but
also to adjust its  size.67 In conjunction, these powers make "Court packing"
63.  See supra text accompanying  notes  24-25. The threat  in Marbury was not unique to its time.
Roughly  sixty  years  later,  Abraham Lincoln  ordered  military officials  to defy  a writ of habeas corpus
issued  during  the  Civil  War  in  Ex parte Merryman.  17  F.  Cas.  144  (1861).  For  discussions  of
Merryman  and  its  context,  see  JAMES  GARFIELD  RANDALL,  CONSTITUTIONAL  PROBLEMS  UNDER
LINCOLN  118-68  (rev.  ed.  1951);  WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST,  ALL THE LAWS  BUT ONE:  CIVIL LIBERTIES
IN WARTIME  (1998).
64.  U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl.  2 (providing that the  Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction  shall
be subject to "such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make").
65.  See  FALLON  ET  AL.,  supra note  5,  at  365-70  (exploring  a  variety  of  issues  involving
congressional  power over the Court's appellate jurisdiction).
66.  In  perhaps  the  most  celebrated  effort  to  define  limits  on  Congress's  power,  Henry  Hart
argued that  any limitations must not be  of a kind  that would "destroy  the essential  role of the  Supreme
Court in the constitutional plan." Henry M. Hart,  Jr.,  The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction  of
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV.  L.  REV.  1362,  1364-65  (1953);  see also Leonard
G.  Ratner, Congressional  Power Over the Appellate Jurisdiction  of  the Supreme Court, 109  U.  PA.  L.
REV.  157 (1960)  (attempting to specify essential  Supreme Court functions limiting Congress's  power to
withdraw jurisdiction).  Akhil Amar  has  argued that the  Constitution  requires  that  some  federal  court
should  have  jurisdiction  over  important  classes  of  cases,  including  all  cases  arising  under  the
Constitution  and  laws  of the  United  States,  but  would  permit  the  withdrawal  of  Supreme  Court
appellate jurisdiction  as  long  as  jurisdiction  remained  in the  lower  federal  courts.  See  Akhil  Reed
Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary  Act of 1789,  138  U.  PA.  L.  REV.  1499 (1990);  Akhil
Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist  View ofArticle III:  Separating  the Two Tiers of Federal  Jurisdiction,  85
B.U. L.  REV.  205 (1985).  Others,  however, have  argued that Congress's  power  to restrict  the Supreme
Court's  appellate jurisdiction  is  essentially unlimited.  See, e.g.,  Herbert  Wechsler,  The Courts and the
Constitution, 65 COLUM.  L. REV.  1001,  1005-06  (1965).
67.  The Constitution does not specify  the size of the Supreme  Court. After  the first judiciary  act
provided that  the Court would  have six  members, see FALLON  ET  AL., supra note 5, at  28, the number
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at least  a potential response  to judicial decisions that aroused political  ma-
jorities adjudge  intolerable.6"
In Marbury, the Court  reached the  only prudent conclusion:  It  could
not,  indeed  must  not,  issue  a  quixotic  order  to  Madison  to  deliver
Marbury's commission. But never before  or since has the Court, in prudent
retreat, displayed more guile to emerge  in glory  from the specter of defeat.
In  the judgment  of many,  Marshall  was  able  to  conclude  that  the  1789
Judiciary  Act  attempted  an unconstitutional  conferral  of original jurisdic-
tion on the Supreme Court only by plainly, possibly willfully, misinterpret-
ing  the  statute.69  The  purported  conferral  of  original  Supreme  Court
jurisdiction in mandamus actions  came in a sentence of the  1789 Judiciary
Act  that began  by  conferring  appellate jurisdiction  on the  Supreme  Court
and then  granting the  authority  to issue  writs  of mandamus.7"  The  natural
reading  would be  that the  Court  could  issue  writs  of mandamus  in cases
properly  before  it,  typically  in  the  exercise  of its  appellate  jurisdiction,
where  such  writs  were  necessary  to  effectuate  its  decisions.7  Marshall,
however,  found  that Congress  had  made  a  free-standing  grant of original
jurisdiction  in mandamus  actions.  He  did so  despite-or perhaps  because
of-constitutional  language  providing  for  original  Supreme  Court
of Justices  reached a high of ten in  1863,  before  being reduced  briefly to seven  and then settling at the
current nine in  1869. See id. at 35.
68.  See  generally  WILLIAM  E.  LEUCHTENBURG,  THE  SUPREME  COURT  REBORN:  THE
CONSTITUTIONAL  REVOLUTION  IN  THE  AGE  OF  ROOSEVELT  (1995)  (discussing  President  Franklin
Roosevelt's failed Court-packing  effort and its long-run significance).
69.  See,  e.g.,  Akhil  Reed  Amar,  Marbury,  Section  13,  and  the  Original Jurisdiction of the
Supreme  Court,  56  U.  CHI.  L.  REV.  443,  456  (1989)  (concluding  that  Marshall  misinterpreted  the
statutory  provision that  he subsequently  found to  be  unconstitutional  as so  interpreted);  David  Currie,
The Constitution  in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First Congress,  1789-1791,  61  U.  CHI.  L. REV.
775,  865 n.507 (1994)  (same). But see James Pfander, Marbury, Original  Jurisdiction,  and the Supreme
Court's Supervisory Powers, 101  COLUM.  L.  REV.  1515  (2001)  (concluding that Marshall's  statutory
conclusion  was well  founded).  For further discussion  of Pfander's  revisionist  thesis,  see  infra notes
240-47  and accompanying  text.
70.  Act of Sept. 24,  1789,  1 Stat. 73,  §  13 (1845),  provides:
The Supreme Court shall  also have appellate jurisdiction  from the circuit  courts and courts of
the several states, in the cases herein after provided for; and shall have power to issue writs of
prohibition  to  the  district  courts,  when  proceeding  as  courts  of  admiralty  and  maritime
jurisdiction,  and writs of mandamus,  in cases warranted by the principles and usages of law,
to any courts appointed, or persons holding  office, under the authority of the United States.
Id. From  this sentence,  Marshall  quoted only the  final  fragment referring  to writs  of mandamus.  See
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,  173 (1803).
The  quoted  language  comes  from  the  1845  version  of  the  Statutes  at  Large.  Although
commentators  have  generally  assumed  that  this was  the  language  on  which  Marshall  relied,  James
Pfander  argues  that  Marshall  was  more  likely  to  have  consulted  a  1796  edition  of the  officially
authorized,  but  privately  published,  Laws  of the  United  States,  which  substituted  a  colon  for  the
semicolon  in the quoted sentence  and capitalized  the "And"  that immediately  follows it. Pfander, supra
note 69,  at  1535-39.  According  to Pfander, the  text of the privately published  1796  edition  supports  a
revisionist  conclusion  that  Congress  actually  intended  to  vest  the  Court  with  a  "freestanding"
mandamus jurisdiction. See id
71.  See Amar, supra note 69, at 456.
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jurisdiction in a small category of cases, 2 not including mandamus actions,
and  asserting  that  "in  all  other cases"  the Court  "shall  exercise  appellate
jurisdiction."73 Marshall's broad interpretation of the statute enabled him to
hold the statute unconstitutional, thereby establishing  the precedent of judi-
cial  review,  even  as  he avoided  a  collision with  the Jefferson  administra-
tion by denying Marbury  any relief.
In  standard  renditions,  Marshall's  political  motivations  and  wiliness
dominate the analysis of Marbury v. Madison and illuminate  its political or
prudential face.74 The  core insight  is  that the Court must sometimes  avoid
conflicts that might  subject it  to rebuff or retaliation.75 Other prescriptions
may  also  emerge  from  this  face,  depending  on  how  broadly  Marbury's
prudential rationale is  understood. Even if the face of prudence  is typically
one  of judicial  self-abnegation,  there  may  be  occasions  when  prudence
counsels an otherwise constitutionally  dubious assertion  of judicial power.
In Marbury itself, for  example,  the Court arguably  invented  a nonexistent
statutory  jurisdiction  in  order  to be  able  to  hold,  at  least  debatably,  that
Congress had overstepped constitutional bounds.76
72.  See U.S.  CONST.  art lII, § 2, cl. 2 ("In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and  Consuls,  and  those  in  which  a  States  shall  be  a Party,  the  supreme  Court  shall  have  original
Jurisdiction.").
73.  Id.
74.  See, e.g.,  MCCLOSKEY,  supra note  19,  at 40  ("The decision is a masterwork of indirection, a
brilliant example of Marshall's capacity to sidestep danger while seeming to  court it, to advance on one
direction while his opponents are looking  in another.");  Amar, supra note 69,  at 462  ("In the middle of
a political minefield...  John Marshall  managed to empower his branch even as  he backed away from a
fight with a new  and popular President.");  see also Pfander, supra note  69,  at  1515-18  (summarizing
authorities  that  reached  the  conclusion  that  Marshall's  decision  was  politically  motivated).  But  see
ROBERT  LOWRY  CLINTON,  MARBURY  V. MADISON AND  JUDICIAL  REVIEW  79-138 (1989)  (arguing  that
Marshall's Marbury  opinion was essentially innocent of political motivation).
75.  See, e.g.,  McCLOSKEY,  supra note  19,  at 229-31  (arguing that  "the Court's greatest  successes
have  been  achieved  when  it  has  operated  near  the  margins  rather  than  at  the  center  of political
controversy" and that "[i]t would  be a  pity if the judges, having done  so  much, should now once  more
forget the limits that their own history so compellingly prescribes").
According to Mark Graber, Marshall's canonical opinion in Cohens v.  Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264  (1821),  also  followed  a shrewdly  prudential  approach,  analogous to  that apparently  adopted  in
Marbury: Marshall  made  palatable  an  assertion of Supreme  Court  authority  to review  state  criminal
decisions,  despite  objections  founded  on  the  Eleventh  Amendment,  by  reaching  the  implausible
conclusion that  the state conviction at  issue did not violate  federal law. Mark A. Graber,  The Passive-
Aggressive  Virtues:  Cohens  v.  Virginia  and the Problematic Establishment of Judicial Power, 12
CONST.  COMMENT.  67 (1995);  see also R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall,  McCulloch v. Maryland, and
the Southern States' Rights  Tradition, 33  J. MARSHALL  L.  REV.  875  (2000)  (discussing  Marshall's
response to hostility to Supreme Court authority).
76.  See Van Alstyne, supra note 61,  at  31  (observing that the  constitutional reference  to  cases  in
which the Supreme Court would have  original jurisdiction might  have been interpreted as specifying an
irreducible minimum, not a maximum). But see Amar, supra note 69,  at 463-78  (arguing that Marbury
was  correct  in  reading  Article  iII  as  establishing  specific  limits on  the  Supreme  Court's  appellate
jurisdiction).
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Cases  in which the Court has failed  for arguably prudential reasons to
enforce  individual  rights  often occasion  regret.77  By  contrast, Marbury is
almost invariably  viewed as  a judicial  triumph.78  The  case's  political  and
prudential  face is thus perhaps the best possible face to represent the school
of constitutional  thought  that  emphasizes  the  need  for judicial  prudence.
Vivid  illustration  comes from a  recent article  by Laurence Tribe,  in which
he  imagines how  disastrous the result might have been had Marbury been
decided  by a Court displaying  the brazen  arrogance that he ascribes  to the
current  Court.
79  Tribe's  imagined  scenario  ends  with  the  Court's  conclu-
sion  that  "'[h]ence  the  writ  shall  issue'-at  which  point  all  hell  breaks
loose,  Jefferson  tells  Madison  to  defy  the  Court,  Marshall  and  several
colleagues  are  impeached  and  convicted,  and  the  next  200  years  look
entirely different."8
B.  The Continuing  Influence of  the Three Faces in Modern
Constitutional  Practice
At least in the eyes of some, each of Marbury's faces  holds an essen-
tial  moral,  political,  or  functional  truth  about judicial  review.  Moreover,
although the faces point in different directions, each is reflected in contem-
porary doctrine and practice.
1.  The Influence of the Private-Rights  Face
To reject the minimal  demand  of Marbury's private-rights face-that
courts must vindicate private rights whenever called upon to do so in order
to  resolve  concrete  disputes-would  be  to  compromise  an  ideal  that  has
seemed  almost self-evidently correct  to many, if not most, American  con-
stitutionalists.  This  is  the  vision  that  inspires  Henry  Hart's  magisterial
Dialogue,"'  which continues  to be the  most acclaimed  and  forceful  schol-
arly  statement  of  the  necessary  role  of  courts  in  the  constitutional
77.  See, e.g.,  MCCLOSKEY,  supra  note  19, at 201  (criticizing  Supreme Court decisions upholding
the  forced  relocation  of  Japanese  Americans  during  World  War  II);  MICHAEL  J.  PERRY,  THE
CONSTITUTION  IN THE  COURTS:  LAW  OR  POLITICS  145 (1994)  (characterizing  Plessy v. Ferguson,  163
U.S.  537 (1896),  which upheld race-based segregation, as "ridiculous  and shameful").
78.  See,  e.g.,  CHEMERINSKY,  supra note  35,  at  13  ("The  brilliance  of John  Marshall's  opinion
cannot  be overstated.").
79.  See Laurence  H. Tribe,  Erog v. Hsub  and Its Disguises: Freeing  Bush v.  Gore from Its Hall
of  Mirrors, 115  HARV.  L.  REV.  170, 303 (2001).
80.  Id. Explicitly  assuming  that  the  Court should  sometimes  act with the  prudential  sensibility
that he identifies with Marbury,  Tribe continues:
What  the Court  needs  now is  not a curtailment  of the  power that Marbury  established,  but a
return  to the  contextual  self-awareness  that  Marbury displayed.  How  much  and  when  the
Court  should  decide  depends  on  the  constitutional  principle  to  be  vindicated,  the political
controversy  in  which  a  controversy  is  embedded,  and  the  social,  cultural,  and  historical
sources at play.
Id.  at 304.
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scheme:  Where  courts  sit,  the  demands  of law  and  constitutional  rights
must prevail.82  The  proposition that  it  is  the core judicial  duty  to enforce
the rights of individuals  echoes equally  strongly  in the work of contempo-
rary liberals such as Ronald Dworkin.1
3
At  the  level  of  doctrine,  I  know  of no  case  in  which  a  court  has
claimed  that courts have  a  general  discretion  simply to  decline to  enforce
an  otherwise  justiciable  and  valid  claim  of  legal  right. 8 4  Under  a  few
"abstention"  doctrines  the  Supreme  Court has  asserted  a discretion  to  re-
quire  that a  claim of right should be  adjudicated  in the  first instance  in  a
state,  rather than  a  federal, court. 8 5 Legal  doctrine also  acknowledges  sig-
nificant judicial discretion  in the award of equitable remedies,  which tradi-
tionally were not available as of right. 8 6 But the abstention doctrines, which
are  themselves  controversial, 7 speak only to the duties of federal  courts in
cases  in which  they enjoy concurrent jurisdiction with  state  courts, not to
the obligations of the nation's judiciary as  a whole. Even when  abstention
doctrines  are taken  into account,  the Supreme Court refers regularly to the
federal  courts'  "virtually unflagging obligation" to exercise the jurisdiction
conferred by Congress.88
82.  See id  at 1393  (asserting  that "the Constitution  always  applies  when  a court  is sitting with
jurisdiction  in  habeas  corpus"  and  that  "the  court  has  always  to  inquire...  whether  the  petitioner
before  it has  been  'deprived  of life,  liberty, or property,  without  due process  of law'). This  was also
the  view  of Hart's  great  collaborator.  See  Herbert  Wechsler,  The  Courts and the  Constitution, 65
COLUM.  L.  REV.  1001,  1006  (1965)  (asserting  that under Marbury, courts  must decide  cases  within
their jurisdiction  in order to "give effect to the supreme law of the land").
83.  See,  e.g.,  DWORKIN,  supra note  10,  at  xi  (asserting  that  "[i]ndividual  rights  are  political
trumps  held by individuals").
84.  Admittedly,  this claim  is  carefully  formulated.  As the  remainder  of this paragraph  suggests,
although  courts have  no  "general  discretion"  to decline  to  enforce  rights,  a  number of justiciability,
immunity,  and  remedial  doctrines  create  circumstances  under  which  there  is  no  available  judicial
remedy for legal  and  constitutional  rights,  notwithstanding  Marbury's famous  dictum  to the contrary.
See  Richard  H.  Fallon,  Jr.  &  Daniel  J. Meltzer,  New  Law,  Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional
Remedies,  104  HARV.  L. REV.  1731,  1779-86  (1991)  (describing  departures  from the  maxim  that  for
every right there must be a remedy).
85.  See, e.g.,  Younger  v. Harris,  401  U.S.  37  (1971)  (establishing  the  Younger doctrine  under
which  federal  courts  will characteristically  abstain  from enjoining  pending  state judicial proceedings
brought  by  state  officials  to  enforce  state  law  or  otherwise  implicating  important  state  interests);
Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co.,  312 U.S. 496 (1941)  (initiating the Pullman  doctrine  under
which  federal  courts  will  sometimes  abstain  from  deciding  cases  presenting  federal  constitutional
questions  pending  state  court  resolution  of  difficult  state  law  issues  that  might  moot  or  alter  the
constitutional  issue).  See generally FALLON  ET  AL.,  supra note  5,  at  1222-1336  (discussing  federal
abstention doctrines).
86.  See  generally DOUGLAS  LAYCOCK,  MODERN  AMERICAN  REMEDIES  229-344  (2d  ed.  1994)
(discussing principles governing  availability of equitable remedies).
87.  For a  spirited  attack,  see  MARTIN  H.  REDISH,  THE  FEDERAL  COURTS  IN  THE  POLITICAL
ORDER:  JUDICIAL  JURISDICTION  AND  AMERICAN  POLITICAL  THEORY  47-74  (1991).  For  a  thoughtful
defense,  see  David  L.  Shapiro,  Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60  N.Y.U.  L.  Rev.  543,  545  (1985)
(maintaining  that  claims  of a  virtually  exceptionless  obligation  to  exercise jurisdiction  "are  far  too
grudging in their recognition ofjudicial discretion in matters ofjurisdiction").
88.  See,  e.g.,  Quackenbush  v. Allstate  Ins.  Co.,  517  U.S.  706,  716  (1996)  (quoting  Colorado
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 821  (1976));  Wilton v. Seven  Falls Co.,CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 91:1
Although  Marbury's private-rights  face  is  perhaps  most  forceful  in
identifying the courts'  minimal  duty, its justification  of the judicial role  by
reference  to  the  imperative  of vindicating  concrete  rights  also  highlights
the  hazards  of a broader judicial  function.  If courts  attempt  to  do  more,
they  invite  objections  that  they  have trenched  on domains  more properly
reserved for political judgment.89
In post-Marbury decisions,  the principle that courts  should engage  in
constitutional  adjudication  only to protect the concrete  rights of identified
individuals  finds  abundant  expression.  Standing  doctrine  affords  one
prominent example.9° The Supreme  Court has asserted recurrently  that fed-
eral  courts  may  not  exercise  jurisdiction  at  all  in  the  absence  of  a
"distinct  and  palpable"  injury  to  particular  individuals.9  This  limitation,
the  Court  has  stated,  is  "founded  in  concern  about  the  proper-and
properly  limited-role  of the  courts  in  a  democratic  society."92  The  doc-
trine  of constitutional  avoidance93  furnishes  another  example  of judicial'
515  U.S.  277,  283  (1995)  (also quoting  Colorado  River  Water Conservation Dist., 424  U.S.  at  813,
817-18);  see also England  v.  La.  Bd.  of Med.  Exam'rs,  375  U.S.  411,  415  (1964)  ("When  a federal
court  is properly  appealed to  in a case over  which it has by law jurisdiction,  it is  its duty to take such
jurisdiction.");  Cohens v.  Virginia,  19  U.S. (6  Wheat.)  264, 404 (1821)  (Marshall,  C.J.)  ("We  have no
more right to  decline the exercise  of a jurisdiction which  is given, than to usurp that which is not given.
The  one or the  other would  be treason  to the  Constitution.").  See generally James Rehnquist,  Taking
Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine,  46  STAN.  L. REV.  1049,  1102-05  (1994)
(arguing that the Cohens dictum is  reconcilable with  abstention doctrines).
89.  See Raines  v.  Byrd, 521  U.S. 811,  828-29  (1997)  (quoting United  States v.  Richardson,  418
U.S.  166,  192 (1974)  (Powell,  J.,  concurring) (asserting  that it is the judicial  role  in protecting concrete
minority  rights,  "not  some  amorphous  general  supervision  of the  operations  of government,  that  has
maintained  public  esteem  for  the  federal  courts  and  has  permitted  the  peaceful  coexistence  of the
countermajoritarian  implications  of judicial  review  and  the  democratic  principles  upon  which  our
Federal  Government  in the final  analysis  rests")),
90.  See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,  576 (1992)  (citing Marbury's assertion that
"[tihe  province  of the  court..,  is,  solely,  to  decide  on  the  rights  of  individuals"  as  authority  for
denying congressional  authority to authorize  citizen  suits to vindicate the public interest);  Valley Forge
Christian  Coll.  v.  Ams.  United  for  Separation  of  Church  &  State,  454  U.S.  464,  473-74  (1982)
(asserting  that since  Marbury,  judicial  review has been  exercised only  as  "a  tool of last resort"  where
necessary  to protect only those litigants  who can demonstrate "injury  in fact"); see also Antonin Scalia,
The Doctrine of  Standing as an  Essential Element of  the Separation of Powers,  17  SUFFOLK  U. L. REV.
881,  894 (1983).
The  law  of  standing  roughly  restricts  courts  to  their  traditional  undemocratic  role  of
protecting  individuals  and minorities  against impositions  of the majority,  and excludes  them
from  the  even  more  undemocratic  role  of prescribing  how  the  other  two  branches  should
function  in order to serve the interest of the majority itself.
Id.
91.  See, e.g.,  Allen  v. Wright,  468  U.S. 737,  751  (1984)  (quoting Gladstone,  Realtors v.  Vill.  of
Bellwood, 441  U.S. 91,  100 (1979)  (quoting Warth v.  Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501  (1975))).
92.  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
93.  The  classic  articulation  of the  desirability  of avoiding  constitutional  decisions  is  Justice
Brandeis's concurring  opinion  in Ashwander v.  Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S.  288, 346 (1936),
which outlined seven numbered rules  under which  the Court avoids "passing  upon a large part of all the
constitutional questions pressed upon it for  decision."  According  to Gerald Gunther, three of Brandeis's
avoidance  rules  involve  justiciability  doctrines  defining  "situations  in  which  there  is  no  'case'  or
'controversy'  in  terms  of the jurisdictional  content of Article  Ill"  and  no  element of judicial  choice2003] MARBURY AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL MIND
self-limitation  that  reflects  Marbury's private-rights  face,  which justifies
constitutional adjudication  only insofar as it is necessary  "to  decide on  the
rights  of individuals."94  In  one  of its  aspects,  the avoidance  doctrine  pre-
scribes that courts will resolve constitutional issues only as a matter of last
resort  and  strict necessity.95 For  example,  when  a  party  seeking  relief on
constitutional grounds also asserts a claim under a federal statute or regula-
tions,  the  Court  almost  invariably  decides  the  nonconstitutional  issues
first.96  Another  frequently  cited  prescription  of constitutional  avoidance
calls  for courts to prefer statutory  interpretations  that do not generate con-
stitutional  difficulties:  "[W]here  an otherwise  acceptable  construction of a
statute would raise serious constitutional  problems,  the Court will construe
the  statute  to  avoid  such  problems  unless  such  construction  is  plainly
contrary to the intent of Congress."97
2.  The Influence of the Special-Functions  Face
Myriad  aspects  of the current  legal  structure  are  difficult,  if not im-
possible,  to  rationalize  except  in  light  of Marbury's special-functions
face.98  The  statutory  structure  governing  Supreme  Court review  of lower
therefore enters the picture. Gerald Gunther,  The Subtle Vices of the "Passive  Virtues "-A Comment on
Principle and Expediency  in  Judicial Review,  64  COLUM.  L.  REV.  1,  17  (1964).  Gunther  also
emphasizes  that  the  other four  involve "avoidance  only of some  or all of the  constitutional  questions
argued, not avoidance of all decision on the merits  ....  Id.  at  16.
94.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.  (I Cranch)  137,  170 (1803);  see also Cohens v. Virginia,  19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.)  264, 441  (1821)  (Marshall,  C.J.)  (asserting that  where  a case  can  be resolved  on statutory
grounds, "it  will be unnecessary, and consequently improper, to pursue  any inquiries, which would then
be merely  speculative, respecting the power of congress in the case").
95.  See, e.g., Dep't of Commerce  v.  United States  House of Representatives,  525 U.S.  316,  343
(1999)  ("If there  is  one doctrine  more  deeply  rooted  than  any  other  in  the  process  of constitutional
adjudication,  it  is  that  we  ought  not  to  pass  on  questions  of  constitutionality..,  unless  such
adjudication  is unavoidable.") (quoting Spector Motor  Serv. v. McLaughlin, 323  U.S.  101,  105  (1944)).
96.  See,  e.g.,  id.;  United  States  v.  Locke,  471  U.S.  84,  93  (1985).  See  generally Lisa  A.
Kloppenberg,  Avoiding Constitutional  Questions, 35 B.C. L.  REV.  1003  (1994)  (describing this as the
"last resort  rule").
97.  Edward J.  DeBartolo Corp. v.  Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,  485 U.S. 568,
575  (1988).  The  canon  that  courts  should  construe  statutes  to  avoid  constitutional  difficulties  has
recently attracted  criticism.  See, e.g.,  Richard  Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In  the Classroom and
in  the  Courtroom, 50  U.  Cm.  L.  REV.  800,  816  (1983)  (arguing  that  "[t]he  practical  effect  of
interpreting  statutes to avoid raising constitutional  questions  is... to enlarge  the already vast  reach  of
constitutional  prohibition  beyond  even  the  most  extravagant  modem  interpretation  of  the
Constitution");  Frederick  Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995  SuP. CT.  REV.  71,  98 (maintaining  that
although the  avoidance  canon  is widely viewed  as  a "vehicle  of judicial restraint[,J  ...  [p]erhaps  it is
anything  but,"  because  its actual  effect  is  to permit judges  to "substitute  their judgment  for  that  of
Congress" without assuming responsibility  for rendering  a constitutional holding).
98.  See  Fallon  &  Meltzer, supra note  84,  at  1800-01  (asserting  that  "there  exists  a  substantial
body  of case  law,  rising almost  to the  level  of a  constitutional  tradition,  in  which ...  constitutional
adjudication..,  functions more  as a vehicle  for the pronouncement  of norms than for the resolution  of
particular disputes,"  and linking  this body  of law to Marbury, in which,  "[r]ather  than  observing the
principle  of  strict  necessity  ...  the  Court  used  William  Marbury's  case  to  resolve  a  number  of
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court judgments  furnishes  one  plain  example.99  Since  1988,  the  Court's
appellate jurisdiction has been  almost entirely  discretionary."'  By the time
that the Court considers  a case,  trial and  typically appeal  have already  oc-
curred;  there  is neither  statutory nor constitutional  necessity  of further  re-
view. 0'  Rather,  in  choosing  which  cases  to  decide,  the  Court  considers
which  issues  most  deserve  its attention  in  light  of the  public  interest  in
achieving  clarity  and  uniformity  in  constitutional  law." 0 2  After  granting
review,  the Court routinely issues  broad pronouncements,  not rulings  nar-
rowly tailored  to the case before  it.'01 3 In order to  achieve doctrinal  clarifi-
cation  on  multiple  fronts,  the  Court  occasionally  renders  alternative
holdings.0 4  The Court has also emphasized  its own special  function  in the
constitutional  regime  by  insisting  that  its  views  of what  the  Constitution
requires,  once  pronounced,  bind  all  branches  of  government  in  future
cases,  not  merely  the  parties  whose  rights  were  adjudicated." 5  Citing
Marbury,  the Court has thus held that Congress cannot expand the substan-
tive  reach  of constitutional  rights  beyond  previous  judicial  definitions,
even  when  acting  pursuant  to  Section  5 of the  Fourteenth  Amendment,
which  authorizes  Congress  to  "enforce,  by  appropriate  legislation,  the
provisions of this article."'0 6
A  number  of  doctrines  applied  by  lower  courts  similarly  reflect
Marbury's special-functions  face  by  recognizing  public  interests-partly
distinct from  the personal rights of the parties-in  the declaration  and en-
forcement  of constitutional  norms. For example,  in a variety of settings,  a
litigant may invoke "third-party  standing" and seek judicial relief based not
99.  See generally Edward  A.  Hartnett,  Questioning Certiorari:  Some  Reflections Seventy-Five
Years After the Judges'Bill,  100 COLUM.  L. REV.  1643 (2000)  (criticizing the certiorari jurisdiction and
its impact on the Supreme Court's sense of its role in the constitutional scheme).
100.  See  Bennett  Boskey &  Eugene  Gressman,  The  Supreme Court Bids Farewell  to Mandatory
Appeals, in 109 S.  CT.  109 (1988).
101.  See  Hartnett,  supra note  99,  at  1714-15  (observing  that  the  Court's  certiorari  practice
"completely  undercuts"  the  rationale of Marbury's private-rights  face  that "judicial review  is  the by-
product of a court's  obligation to decide  a case");  Daniel  J. Meltzer, The Judiciary's  Bicentennial,  56
U. CHi.  L. REV. 423, 430 (1989).
102.  See Sup. CT.  R. 10  (1999)  (listing among the factors that the Court  considers  in determining
whether to  grant certiorari  whether a state court or court of appeals  has "decided  an important  federal
question  in a way  that  conflicts with  the  decision"  of another court  and whether  "a state  court  or a
United  States court of appeals has  decided an important  question of federal  law that has not been,  but
should be, settled by  this Court").  According  to  Edward  Hartnett,  the Court's  agenda-setting capacity
far  outruns  the  private  rights  rationale  in Marbury that judicial review  is  merely  an  incident of the
necessity  to decide cases  and instead endows the Court  with a policy-making function. Hartnett, supra
note 99, at  1718-19.
103.  For  a defense  of Supreme  Court  practice  in  articulating clear  rules to  govern decisions by
lower courts in future cases, see Antonin Scalia, The Rule of  Law as a Law of  Rules, 56 U. CHI.  L. REV.
1175,  1178-79  (1989).
104.  See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 84, at  1801.
105.  See  Cooper  v.  Aaron,  358  U.S.  1, 18  (1958)  (equating  the  Court's  interpretation  of the
Constitution  in a decided case with "the  supreme law of the land").
106.  City of Boeme  v. Flores,  521  U.S. 507, 517 (1997).
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on her own constitutional  rights, but on the rights of persons not before the
court." 7  The  obvious  aim  is to  protect  public  and  third-party  rights.  The
notion  that the judiciary  has  a special  function of broadly assuring  adher-
ence  to  constitutional  norms also  finds manifestation  in First Amendment
overbreadth  doctrine,  which permits  courts to  invalidate  entire  statutes  at
the behest of parties whose own conduct is not constitutionally protected to
ensure  that  others  are  not  "chilled"  in  the  exercise  of protected  speech
rights. "8
Mootness  doctrine  contains  additional  reflections  of Marbury's spe-
cial-functions  face.0 9 At its core, mootness  doctrine  embodies the premise
of the private-rights  model that courts will decide constitutional issues only
as necessary to vindicate  the personal rights of parties with concrete  griev-
ances." '  But  the  Court  has  introduced  elements  of flexibility  to  permit
courts  to fulfill their "special  function"  of declaring  and broadly  enforcing
constitutional  norms."'  A  plain  example  resides  in  the  traditional
"exception"  to  mootness  doctrine  for  cases  "capable  of  repetition,  yet
evading review.""' 2 The unmistakable goal  is to permit the courts to articu-
late  and  enforce  constitutional  norms that could  not be  vindicated  effec-
tively in private-rights disputes." 3
107.  See, e.g.,  Caplin & Drysdale,  Chartered v. United States, 491  U.S. 617, 623  n.3 (1989);  Craig
v. Boren,  429 U.S.  190,  192-96 (1976);  NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,459 (1958).
108.  See  Osborne  v.  Ohio,  495  U.S.  103,  116  n.12  (1990)  ("In  the  First  Amendment
context, ...  '[b]ecause  of the  sensitive  nature  of constitutionally  protected  expression, we  have  not
required  that  those  subject  to  overbroad  regulations  risk  prosecution  to  test  their rights.  For  free
expression-of  transcendent value to all society, and not merely to those exercising their rights-might
be  the loser."')  (quoting  Dombrowski  v. Pfister,  380 U.S.  479, 486 (1965));  see generally Richard H.
Fallon, Jr.,  Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE  L.J. 853 (1991)  (discussing the nature, scope, and
rationale of  overbreadth doctrine).
109.  Mootness  doctrine reflects  the  basic  idea  that  "[t]here  is no  case  or  controversy  once  the
matter has been resolved." WRIGHT &  KANE, supra note 40,  at 63.
110.  See id. at  61-62 (noting the  general  "case  or controversy"  limitation on judicial review and
linking it to Marbury's  argument  that "a court has power to  declare a statute unconstitutional only as a
consequence of the power to decide a  case properly before it").
111.  See  United  States  Parole  Comm'n  v.  Geraghty,  445  U.S.  388,  400  (1980)  (describing
mootness as a "flexible" doctrine).
112.  S. Pac. Terminal  Co. v. ICC,  219  U.S. 498,  515  (1911).
113.  See  Daniel  J.  Meltzer,  Deterring  Constitutional  Violations  by  Law  Enforcement
Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys  General, 88  COLUM.  L.  REv.  247,  301  &
n.309 (1988)  ("[T]he origins of the doctrine betray concern about resolving issues that might otherwise
evade review, in order to protect the rights of  parties other than the  litigant whose case is moot.").
Within  the  domain  of mootness  doctrine,  another  example  of the  influence  of Marbury's special-
functions face comes from the Court's express  abandonment, in Friends  of  the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.  167,  190 (2000), of its characterization of  mootness as  the doctrine of "standing
set in a time frame."  See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S.  43, 68 n.22  (1997);  Geraghty,
445 U.S.  at 397 (1980).  Expressly recognizing the public interest  in achieving judicial resolution of issues,
not just controversies, Friends of the Earth ruled that "there  are circumstances in which the  prospect that a
defendant will engage in  (or resume)  harmful  conduct may be  too  speculative to  support standing, but not
too speculative to overcome  mootness."  528  U.S. at  190.
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The law of official  immunity provides an  especially vivid example of
a doctrine  reflecting a  special-functions  conception  of the judicial  role. In
suits  alleging  constitutional  violations,  public  officials  ordinarily  enjoy
immunity  from damages liability unless they violated "clearly  established"
rights." 4  In implementing this immunity rule, the Supreme Court has stated
that lower courts should decide  first whether the right claimed by the plain-
tiff exists at  all and only  then determine  whether it was clearly established
at  the time  of the defendant's  alleged  conduct."5  If the  Court  wanted  to
avoid unnecessary  resolution of constitutional  issues, it would prescribe  a
different order of decision. It would direct the lower courts to begin by ask-
ing  whether  a claimed  constitutional  right,  if it  existed  at all,  was  clearly
established  at the time of an alleged violation. If it is doubtful that a consti-
tutional  right  existed  at  all,  then  the  defendant  could  not have  violated  a
"clearly  established"  right,  and the  damages  claim  could  be dismissed  on
that  basis.  In  cases  of this  kind,  determination  whether  a  constitutional
right actually  exists is  not strictly necessary  to decide the rights  of the par-
ties.  Instead,  the prescribed  order of decision  implicitly acknowledges  the
courts'  special  function  of resolving uncertain  constitutional  issues  for the
benefit of the public.' I6
The  special-functions  face  of Marbury may  also  be  seen  in  various
constitutional  rights  first recognized  during the  latter half of the twentieth
century  and in the conceptions  of individual  injury supporting  standing  to
enforce  those  rights."7  To  take just two  examples,  the  injuries underlying
114.  See  Harlow v.  Fitzgerald, 457  U.S. 800, 813-20 (1982).
115.  See County of Sacramento  v.  Lewis, 523  U.S.  833,  842 n.5  (1998)  (asserting  that "the  better
approach  is  to  determine  the  right  before  determining  whether  it  was  previously  established  with
clarity").
116.  See  id. at 841  (recognizing that to adhere to  the avoidance  canon would tend to leave citizens'
rights and officials'  duties "uncertain,  to the detriment  both of officials and individuals").
Further  examples  of doctrines  under which  the  Court prescribes  the  detennination  of constitutional
issues technically  unnecessary  to the decision  of a particular case,  presumably  due to  the public interest  in
having the issues resolved, can be found in a variety of areas.  In cases under the harmless-error doctrine,  the
Court has sometimes  decided first whether constitutional error occurred, then either determined or remanded
for a determination  whether the  error was harmless. See, e.g.,  Pope v. Illinois, 481  U.S. 497, 501-04  (1987).
If an error is judged harmless, the ruling on the "merits"  issue will turn out to be unnecessary  to the  ultimate
decision  to deny relief. Similar results  can occur under United States v.  Leon, 468 U.S.  897 (1984),  which
sometimes  allows  the  introduction  of evidence  obtained  through  unconstitutional  searches  if an  officer
proceeded  in  "good  faith."  The  Court  has  indicated  that  courts  may address  the  constitutional  question
before  ruling  on the  good  faith  issue,  see id  at  925-26,  even  though  a  ruling  that  a search  violated  the
Constitution will be unnecessary  to the ultimate disposition where "good faith"  is found to exist. Once again,
the justification for the order of decision must reside  in a public interest in allowing the courts to specify the
meaning of constitutional norms  in order to guide official conduct in other cases.
117.  See United States v. Richardson,  418  U.S.  166,  194-95 (1974)  (Powell,  J.,  concurring)  (noting
the  occurrence  of  a  "revolution  in  standing  doctrine");  FALLON  ET  AL.,  supra note  5,  at  136-37
(identifying  a strain  on  standing  doctrine  resulting  from  "the  increasing  recognition  of  substantive
constitutional  rights"  protecting  interests  besides  property  and  traditional  conceptions  of individual
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suits  to  vindicate  voting  rights"'  and  rights  under  the  Establishment
Clause" 9  are  typically "broadly  shared"  and  "not  associated with the  kind
of liberty or property interests  protected by the common  law.' 12  In finding
such  suits  to  be  justiciable,  the  Supreme  Court  has  never  formally
abandoned  the  requirement  of  concrete  and  particularized  injury.
Nonetheless,  as  Justice  Powell  once observed,  some  of its  decisions have
"threaten[ed]"  to "transform  [the  concept of 'particularized  injury'] beyond
recognition.''  Commentators  have linked  the motivating concerns with a
special-functions or "public rights" conception of the judicial role.
122
3.  The Influence of  the Political  or Prudential  Face
Cases  involving  prudential  decision  making,  and  thus  reflecting
Marbury's prudential  face,  fall  into  two  principal,  partly  overlapping
categories.
First, in several  areas the  Supreme Court has appealed  openly to pru-
dential considerations  in shaping doctrine and deciding cases.  The doctrine
of stare  decisis presents  a  paradigm  case.'23  The  Court  has said  expressly
that  when  it  "reexamines  a  prior  holding,  its  judgment  is  customarily
informed  by  a  series  of prudential  and  pragmatic  considerations  designed
to test the consistency  of overruling  a prior  decision with the  ideal  of the
rule of law,  and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and overruling
a  prior  case.' 24  In  Planned Parenthood  v.  Casey, the  Court  notoriously
cited  its  apparently  prudential  interest  in maintaining  the  "perception"  of
its own legitimacy 12 5  as a partial justification  for its decision to reaffirm the
118.  See  FALLON  ET  AL.,  supra note  5,  at  136,  181  (identifying  voting-rights  suits with  a  "public
rights"  or  special-functions model  and  noting  the  conceptual difficulty  in  identifying  the  underlying
injury in certain voting-rights cases).
119.  See, e.g.,  Capitol  Square  Review  &  Advisory  Bd.  v.  Pinette,  515  U.S.  753  (1995)
(entertaining  an  Establishment  Clause  challenge  to  a religious  display  on  public  property  without
adverting  to the injury supporting standing); Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492  U.S.  573  (1989)  (same).
120.  FALLON  ET  AL.,  supra  note 5, at  137.
121.  Richardson,  418 U.S.  at  194-95.
122.  See,  e.g.,  FALLON  ET  AL.,  supra note 5, at  136-37  (associating the recognition of standing to
assert  rights  not  linked  to  traditional  liberty  or  property  interests  with a "public  rights"  or  special-
functions rather  than a "private  rights"  model);  Monaghan, supra note 44,  at  1380-83  (describing the
influence of the special-functions model on standing doctrine).
123.  The doctrine of stare  decisis reflects the authority of precedent,  even when  the precedent was
initially mistaken. See, e.g.,  Richard  H.  Fallon,  Jr.,  Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An  Essay on
Constitutional  Methodology,  76 N.Y.U. L. REV.  570, 570  (2001);  Michael Stokes  Paulsen, Abrogating
Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effects of Roe and Casey?,  109
YALE  L.J.  1535, 1538 n.8 (2000).  The  doctrine takes  its  name from  the  Latin maxim  "stare decisis et
non  quieta movere  - stand by the thing decided and do not disturb the calm."  James C. Rehnquist, The
Power  that  Shall be Vested  in  a  Precedent: Stare Decisis,  the Constitution,  and  the Supreme Court,  66
B.U.  L.  REV.  345,  347 (1986).  Abundant  authorities  establish that  "stare decisis is  not  an  inexorable
command";  it  requires  only  that  "a  departure  from  precedent ...  be  supported  by  some  special
justification."  Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S.  428, 443 (2000) (internal quotations omitted).
124.  Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.  833, 854 (1992).
125.  See id at 865.
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essential  holding  of Roe  v.  Wade.'26  The  Court  reasoned  that  the  public
would  cease  to  respect  it  as  a principled  decision  maker  if it  appeared
prone  to overrule  past,  momentous  decisions "under  fire." ' 127  It concluded
on  this  basis  that  overruling  would therefore  require  a  "most  compelling
reason."1
28
The  Court  has also  acknowledged  an expressly  "prudential"  element
in standing  doctrine. 12 9  By the  Court's own  account,  standing  doctrine in-
cludes  some  requirements  mandated  by Article  III,'  but  also a  series  of
judicially  created  prudential  rules.'3'  Prominent  among  the  prudential
standing  requirements  is  a  rule  that  the courts  will  not hear  "generalized
grievances"  shared  by a large class of citizens.12  In justifying the denial of
standing to plaintiffs who satisfy the Constitution's requirements, the Court
has  said  that  recognition  of  standing  based  on  broadly  shared  injuries
would be too likely to enmesh the judiciary in collisions with more democ-
ratically accountable  institutions."'
A  similar  strand  of prudentialism  suffuses  the  "political  question"
doctrine,  under  which  the  Supreme  Court  deems  "certain  allegations  of
unconstitutional  government  conduct"  to  be  "inappropriate  for  judicial
review."'3  The  political-question  doctrine  was  directly  prefigured  in
Marbury's  assertion that "[q]uestions  in their nature political, or which are,
126.  410  U.S.  113  (1973)  (recognizing  a constitutional  right  to abortion prior to the point of fetal
viability).
127.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 867.
128.  Id.
129.  See, e.g.,  Valley  Forge Christian Coll. v.  Ams. United for the  Separation of Church  & State,
454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982);  Warth  v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-502 (1975).
130.  See, e.g.,  Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 472. The Court asserted that
at an  irreducible  minimum,  Art.  Ill  requires  the  party who  invokes  the court's  authority  to
"show  that  he  personally  has  suffered  some  actual  or  threatened  injury  as  a  result  of the
putatively  illegal  conduct of the defendant,"  and that  the  injury  "fairly  can  be  traced  to  the
challenged action" and "is  likely to be redressed by a favorable decision."
Id. (citations  omitted).
131.  Among the "judicially self-imposed  limits" are "the  general  prohibition  on a litigant's raising
another person's legal rights, the rule barring  adjudication of generalized grievances  more appropriately
addressed  in the representative branches,  and the requirement  that a plaintiff's complaint  fall within the
zone of interests protected  by the law invoked."  Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S.  737, 750-51  (1984).
132.  See id
133.  See, e.g.,  Valley Forge, 454 U.S.  at 474 (Powell,  J.,  concurring). Justice Powell noted:
[R]epeated  and essentially  head-on  confrontations  between  the  life-tenured  branch  and  the
representative  branches  of government  will not, in  the long  run, be beneficial  to either. The
public confidence essential to the former and the vitality crucial to the latter  may well erode if
we do  not exercise  self-restraint  in the utilization  of our power  to negative  the actions of the
other branches.
Id. (quoting  United States v. Richardson,  418  U.S. 166,  188 (1974)).
Where  Congress  expressly  confers  standing  to  sue  based  on  widely  shared  but  nonetheless
constitutionally cognizable injuries, the  merely "prudential"  requirements of standing doctrine give way, and
the  Court  will  uphold  standing.  See,  e.g.,  Lujan  v.  Defenders  of  Wildlife,  504  U.S.  555,  578  (1992)
(explaining Congress's  power to  "elevat[e]  to  the  status of legally  cognizable  injuries  concrete, de facto
injuries that were previously inadequate in law" to confer standing).
134.  CHEMERINSKY,  supra note 35,  at 143-44.MARBURY  AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL MIND
by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made
in  this  court."'35  Since  Marbury, the  political-question  doctrine  has  not
achieved much clarity  of definition,'36  but some judicial opinions  and aca-
demic commentators openly recognize  that prudential considerations  influ-
ence the doctrine's application.'37
The  second category  of prudential decision  making, not entirely  dis-
tinct  from  the  first,  encompasses  cases  in  which  the  Supreme  Court  has
shaped particular rulings  (rather than  entire doctrines)  to avert public hos-
tility but has not expressly  acknowledged  this motivation as a basis for de-
cision. The  absence of an express  statement  makes  cases  in this  category
difficult to  identify with  certainty.  Marbury furnishes  a case  in point.  Al-
though most commentators have  seen political  motivations  for the Court's
decision,'38 the opinion nowhere broaches this rationale,  and it  thus can be
disputed  that  prudential  considerations  played  any  role.'39  Nonetheless,
critics have identified a number of decisions that were  likely influenced by
the Court's apprehension of adverse political consequences.
Naim v. Naim affords  a  notorious example. 4° Naim, which  came  be-
fore the Court on appeal as of right, presented  a challenge  to the constitu-
tionality  of a  Virginia  statute  forbidding  interracial  marriage.  The  case
arose  in the  near aftermath  of Brown v. Board of Education, which  man-
dated an end to school segregation. 4'  In a memorandum  read  to his  fellow
135.  Marbury  v.  Madison, 5 U.S.  (I  Cranch)  137,  170  (1803).  Some  commentators  maintain that
Marbury's definition of non-justiciable political questions was a narrow  one.  See,  e.g.,  CHEMERINSKY,
supra note  35,  145  (asserting  that Marshall's definition in Marbury "[ilncluded  only ...  matters  where
the President had unlimited discretion, and there was thus no allegation of a constitutional violation").
136.  See, e.g.,  Martin  Redish, Judicial  Review and the  "Political  Question", 79  Nw.  U.  L.  REV.
1031,  1031  (1985)  (noting that commentators  "have  differed  significantly about the  doctrine's  scope
and rationale").
137.  See, e.g., Nixon v. United States,  506 U.S. 224, 252 (1992)  (Souter,  J.,  concurring) (asserting
that  application  of  the  political-question  doctrine  requires  case-by-case  attention  to  "prudential
concerns");  BICKEL, supra note  5, at  125-26 (asserting  that the discretion  exercised under  the political
question  doctrine  resists  being  characterized  as  "constitutional  interpretation"  and  that  "[t]here
is  ...  something different  about it, in kind not  degree;  something  greatly  more  flexible, something of
prudence, not construction and not principle").
Judge Posner has defended the Supreme Court's recent decision in Bush v. Gore,  531  U.S. 98 (2000), as
supportable  on prudential grounds under what  he terms  a  "a reverse political questions  doctrine."  RICHARD
POSNER,  BREAKING  THE  DEADLOCK:  THE  2000  ELECTION,  THE CONSTITUTION,  AND  THE COURTS  162
(2001).  Posner argues  that if Al Gore had prevailed  in a Florida  recount, Florida's  legislature would have
appointed an  alternate  slate of electors pledged to  Bush,  and that "there  was  a real and disturbing potential
for  disorder  and  temporary  paralysis"  due  to  a foreseeable  division  between  the  Republican-controlled
House and the Democrat-controlled  Senate. Id. at  143. Under  these circumstances, Posner writes, "Political
considerations in a broad, nonpartisan sense"  made  it important for the Court "to intervene."  Id. at  162. But
see Ward Farnsworth,  "To Do a Great Right, Do a Little Wrong"": A User's Guide to Judicial  Lawlessness,
86  MINN.  L. REV.  227  (2001)  (critiquing  Posner's  argument  in  light of the  same  kind  of "pragmatic"
considerations that Posner invokes in support).
138.  See supra note 74.
139.  See supra note 74 (citing the view of Robert Clinton).
140.  350 U.S. 891  (1955).
141.  347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Justices, Justice  Frankfurter argued forcefully  that the miscegenation  issue
aroused  such  deep  emotions  that  a judicial  pronouncement  of invalidity
would  have  the  effect  of  "thwarting  or  seriously  handicapping  the
enforcement  of [our]  decision  in the segregation  cases."'42 Apparently  per-
suaded, the Court remanded the case to the Virginia Supreme Court on  the
pretext that the record  required clarification.'43  On remand,  the state  court
declared the record to be fully adequate and reinstated its former opinion.'44
When the case returned  to the Supreme  Court,  again on appeal  as of right,
the Court voted  to deny review on the plainly disingenuous basis'45 that the
decision  of the Virginia  court in refusing  to clarify  the record  "leaves  the
case devoid of a properly presented federal question."'46
Influential  commentators  have concluded  that  a  series  of nineteenth-
century  cases  revitalizing  the  doctrine  of state  sovereign  immunity" 4 7  re-
flected plainly prudential considerations:  The Justices feared that a judicial
decision  ordering  the  states of the  former  Confederacy  to pay  their debts
would  encounter  defiance.'48  It  has  also  been  suggested  that  reported
threats  by  President Roosevelt  to  defy  a  contrary  decision influenced  the
decision  in  Ex parte Quirin' 49  to  uphold  the  trial  of German  saboteurs
142.  The  memorandum  is  quoted  in  Appendix  D  to  Dennis  J.  Hutchinson,  Unanimity  and
Desegregation: Decisionmaking  in the Supreme Court, 1948-58, 68 GEO.  L.J. 1, 95-96 (1979).
143.  See Naim, 350 U.S. at 891.
144.  See Michael Klarman, An Interpretive Histoiy of  Modern Equal Protection,  90 MICH.  L,  REV.
213,243 (1991).
145.  See  Herbert  Wechsler,  Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,  in  PRINCIPLE,
POLITICS AND  FUNDAMENTAL  LAW 47  (1961)  (terming the  result in Naim "wholly  without basis  in the
law").
146.  Naim, 350 U.S. at 985.
147.  At the  historical core of the doctrine of sovereign  immunity  is the  notion  that  the sovereign
cannot  be sued without  its consent. See generally FALLON  ET  AL., supra note 5, at  1001-02  (discussing
the foundations of sovereign immunity). Although it is much debated whether state sovereign immunity
survived the  ratification of the federal  Constitution, the  Supreme  Court squarely  held that it did not in
Chisholm v.  Georgia, 2 U.S.  (2 Dall.) 419  (1793).  Congress  then responded by proposing  the Eleventh
Amendment,  later ratified by  the states, which provides that "[t]he  Judicial power of the United  States
shall  not be construed  to  extend to  any suit in  law or equity, commenced  or prosecuted  against one of
the  United  States  by Citizens of another  State, or by  Citizens or  Subjects of any Foreign  State."  U.S.
CONST.  amend.  XI. Prior to  the Civil War, the Eleventh Amendment  was narrowly construed. See, e.g.,
Cohens  v. Virginia,  19  U.S. (6  Wheat.)  264,  293,  383  (1821)  (construing  the  Eleventh Amendment  as
inapplicable  to  suits by citizens of the defendant  state and to  all cases,  regardless  of parties,  "arising
under  the constitution  or  laws of the  United States").  But  the Court  broke  from  its pattern of narrow
construction  in a series  of late nineteenth-century  cases culminating  in  Hans v.  Louisiana, 134  U.S.  I
(1890)  (holding that the Eleventh Amendment  bars a federal suit against a state by a citizen of  that  state
alleging a violation of  the Constitution of the United States).
148.  See,  e.g.,  John  J.  Gibbons,  The  Eleventh  Amendment  and  State  Sovereign  Immunity:  A
Reinterpretation,  83  COLUM.  L.  REV.  1889,  1983  (1983)  (asserting  that  "unrelenting  popular
pressure  ...  actually  dictated  [the  Court's]  ultimate  decision"  in  the  culminating  case  of Hans v.
Louisiana); David  L.  Shapiro,  Wrong  Turns:  The  Eleventh Amendment and the  Pennhurst  Case, 98
HARV.  L. REV.  61,  70  (1984)  (describing  the Court's  decision as  motivated by "political  exigencies"
and a recognition that a judgment against the state would prove unenforceable).
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apprehended  in the United  States  during World War II by  a military  com-
mission, not an Article III court. 5 0
Even  when  prudential  thinking  is  not  self-conscious,  Michael
Klarman  is  surely right that  the Justices'  immersion  in the prevailing sen-
timents of their times will often make anything other than a politically pru-
dent  decision  "virtually  unthinkable"  despite  otherwise  formidable  legal
arguments  supporting  a claim of constitutional right.'5'  In illustration of his
thesis,  Klarman argues-without  making claims about  the Justices'  actual
thinking-that it would not have been "realistically possible"  for the Court
to  have  decided  other  than  it  did  in  the  now  vilified  case  of Plessy  v.
Ferguson,' 52 which  held that a system of racially  "separate  but equal"  rail-
road  accommodations  satisfied  the  Equal  Protection  Clause.'53  Klarman
makes  similar  arguments  with  respect  to  Korematsu v.  United States,' 54
which  upheld  the  forced  relocation  of  persons  of  Japanese  ancestry,
American  citizens  not  excepted,  during  World  War  II, and  Dennis  v.
United States,'  decided during the height of the McCarthy  era, which re-
jected  the  argument  that  prosecutions  of Communists  violated  the  First
Amendment.'56
The  influence of Marbury's prudential  face  can  also be  seen,  at  least
indirectly,  in  continuing judicial  insistence  that  courts  must balance  con-
siderations  of  private  right  against  considerations  of  public  interest  in
awarding equitable remedies.'57 In the most famous  invocation  of this doc-
trine  in modem times, the Supreme Court declined to order  immediate  en-
forcement  of its landmark  decision in Brown  v. Board of Education.' 58  In
the apparent hope of allowing public  attitudes  to accommodate  themselves
150.  See Bruce  Ackerman, States of Emergency: Don't Panic,  LONDON  REV.  OF BOOKS,  Jan.  28,
2002,  available at http://www.lrb.co.uk/v24/n03/acke0l.html;  see also WILLIAM  0.  DOUGLAS,  THE
COURT  YEARS,  1939-1975, at  138-39  (1980)  (reporting  that  "[t]he Attorney  General,  Francis  Biddle,
told the  Court  [in  the  Quirin  case]  that  the  claims of the  saboteurs  were  so  frivolous,  the  Army was
going to  go ahead and execute the men whatever the Court  did"); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe,
Waging  War,  Deciding Guilt:  Trying  the  Military  Tribunals, Ill  YALE  L.J.  1259,  1291  (2002)
(asserting  that "it  also  appears that  some  highly questionable  ex  parte  arm-twisting  by the  executive
may have spurred the Supreme Court's unanimous decision").
151.  Michael  J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82  VA.  L.
REV.  1,  26 (1996).
152.  163  U.S. 537 (1896).
153.  Klarman, supra note  151,  at 26.
154.  323 U.S. 214 (1944).
155.  341  U.S. 494 (1954).
156.  See Klarman, supra note  151,  at 27-30.
157.  See, e.g., Int'l  Bhd. of Teamsters  v. United  States,  431  U.S.  324, 375  (1977)  (insisting  that
"in  formulating  any  equitable  decree,  a court  must  draw  on  the  'qualities  of mercy  and practicality
[that] have  made  equity the  instrument for the  nice adjustment  and reconciliation between the  public
interest and private  needs as well as between competing private claims'); see generally Paul Gewirtz,
Remedies and Resistance, 92  YALE  L.J.  585,  598-608  (1983)  (discussing  interest  balancing  in  the
award of remedies for unlawful racial discrimination).
158.  347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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to the ruling, the Court said that it would suffice  for desegregation to occur
"with all deliberate speed." '
In retrospect, many of the cases most easily characterized as involving
covertly  prudential  decision  making  have  been  thought  regrettable,  even
shameful.160  Especially  for that reason,  it  is perhaps  important  to note  that
prudentially  based  adjudication  in  a narrow  band  of highly  charged cases
does  not want  for  normative  defenses.  At  least  four  such  defenses  merit
brief mention.
First,  there  is  a  familiar  consequentialist  argument:  Regrettably  but
justifiably,  the  Court  must  forego  principled  decision  making  in  a  few
cases  in order  to preserve  its  capacity  to function  effectively  in the much
larger  set of cases  in  which  the  public will  tolerate,  if not welcome,  the
Court's vindication of constitutional norms. 6'
Second,  Alexander  Bickel  famously  argued  that  a  society  generally
committed  to principle should not be denied arts of compromise, especially
when the cost of adhering to principle  would be inordinate.'62  When an all-
things-considered calculation favors expediency over rigidity, Bickel main-
tained that courts should employ devices that  allow compromises  to occur
without affirming those compromises'  constitutional validity.'63
Third, I myself have  argued that  especially insofar as there  is reason-
able  disagreement  about  what  constitutional  norms  require,  the  Court
should  hesitate  to impose  its  own morally  laden judgments  in the  face  of
aroused popular sentiment  to the contrary.'64  Interests in the fair allocation
of political  power  sometimes  call  for  the  Court  to  yield  despite  its  own
159.  Brown  v.  Bd.  of Educ.,  349  U.S.  294,  301  (1955)  ("Brown 11').  For  a  discussion  of the
prudential  foundations  of  the  Court's  decision  in  Brown  II,  see  RICHARD  H.  FALLON,  JR.,
IMPLEMENTING  THE  CONSTITUTION  59-60  (2001).  See  generally  Barry  Friedman,  When  Rights
Encounter Reality:  Enforcing Federal  Remedies, 65  S.  CAL.  L.  REV.  735  (1992)  (arguing that judicial
adjustment of remedies  in  light of majoritarian  political opposition  helps soften  the countermajoritarian
thrust  of judicial  review);  Gewirtz,  supra note  157  (examining  when  and  how  courts  should  limit
remedies  in response to public opposition).
160.  See,  e.g.,  PERRY,  supra note  77, at  145 (terming Plessy "ridiculous  and  shameful");  Ronald
Dworkin,  Mr. Liberty, N.Y.  REV.  OF BOOKS,  Aug. 11,  1994,  at 17, 20 n.4 (labeling Dennis "shameful").
By  contrast,  some  decisions  that  seem  equally  difficult  to  rationalize  by  reference  to previous
authorities  seem to  have won acceptance  or even hesitant applause, perhaps because  the right the Court
declined to enforce  has  fallen into  normative  disfavor. As  an example, Judge Posner cites Home Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n v.  Blaisdell, 290  U.S.  398  (1934),  in which the  Court upheld  a Depression-era  debtors'
relief statute  arguably  in  the  teeth  of the  constitutional  prohibition  against  state  impairments  of the
"Obligations  of Contracts,"  U.S. CONST. art.  I, § 10, cl.  2. See POSNER, supra  note  137,  at 173.
161.  See, e.g.,  MCCLOSKEY,  supra note  19,  at 228-31  (arguing  that the  Court must not jeopardize
its capacity to function  as an overall force  for  good by  rendering  politically unacceptable  decisions on
issues of central political concern).
162.  BICKEL, supra note 5, at 64, 68.
,163.  id.  at  69-72. Bickel  argues that the Court should use devices such as justiciability doctrines  to
avoid  -ruling  on  the  constitutional  merits  and  thereby  escape  the  necessity  to  choose  between
'legitimating"  a  statute  that  is  inconsistent  with  sound  constitutional  principles  and precipitating  a
collision with  ascendant political forces. Id.  at 70-71.
164.  FALLON, supra  note  159, at 51-52.
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conscientious  judgment  that  a  claim of constitutional  right  should other-
wise prevail.'65
Fourth,  Cass Sunstein has  argued that courts  should not insist on up-
holding  novel  claims  of constitutional  right  when  a  "favorable"  decision
would predictably  trigger a public backlash with adverse  consequences  for
the rights-holders.16  In illustration  of this position,  Sunstein  argues that  a
contemporary  court should not recognize  a constitutional  right to gay mar-
riage, even if the court believed that such a right ought to exist as a matter
of constitutional principle:
If the [Court]  accepted the view that all states must authorize same-
sex  marriages  in  2001,  or  even  2003,  we  might  well  expect  a
constitutional  crisis, a weakening of the legitimacy of the Court, an
intensifying of hatred of homosexuals,  a constitutional amendment
overturning  the  Court's  decision,  and  much  more.  Any  court
should hesitate in the face of such prospects. 1 6 7
III
CONFLICTS  AMONG  THE FACES
Although  Marbury's three  faces  all have  enduring  resonance  in con-
temporary  legal  doctrine  and  in widely shared  understandings  of the judi-
cial  function,  it  scarcely  needs  demonstration  that  those  faces,  and  the
strands  of doctrine and thought that they support,  exist in tension with  one
another.
To  begin  with, Marbury's private-rights  face  conflicts  overtly  with
both  the  special-functions  and  prudential  theories  of the judicial  role.'68
According  to  the private-rights  model,  courts  are justified  in pronouncing
on constitutional issues  only insofar as they must do so to resolve concrete
disputes.  As  discussed  above,  numerous  doctrines  rest  on  this  founda-
tion.'69  For example,  standing  rules require  concrete  adversity between the
parties,  and  the  avoidance  canon  calls  for  courts  to  decide  constitutional
issues  only as  a  last resort.  Obviously,  however,  these  limitations  on  the
judicial  role  are  in  tension  with  Marbury's special-functions  face,  which
postulates  the  general,  systemic  importance  of  judicial  resolution  of
165.  In offering this argument, I have  distinguished between defensible  decisions not to recognize
a  right  for  the  first  time  and  decisions,  which  I  believe  indefensible,  to  refuse  to  enforce  well-
established rights due to fear of adverse reaction. See id at 53-55.
166.  CASS  SUNSTEIN,  ONE  CASE  AT  A  TIME:  JUDICIAL  MINIMALISM  ON  THE  SUPREME  COURT
161-62  (1999).
167.  Id.
168.  See Wechsler, supra note  82,  at  1006  ("Federal courts, including  the  Supreme Court,  do not
pass  on  constitutional  questions  because  there  is  a  special  function  vested  in  them  to  enforce  the
Constitution  or  police the  other  agencies  of government,"  but because  "they  must  decide  a  litigated
issue  that is  otherwise  within their jurisdiction  and in doing  so  must give effect to the  supreme law  of
the land").
169.  See supra  text accompanying notes 98-102.
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constitutional  issues  and  welcomes  judicial  decision  making  that  is  not
strictly necessary  to resolve concrete  disputes between particular  individu-
als.  Again  at the  risk of laboring  the  obvious,  all  of the  doctrines  that  I
cited  above  to  illustrate  the continuing  influence  of the  special-functions
face  demonstrate  this  incompatibility.  When  the Supreme  Court exercises
its  certiorari  jurisdiction,  its  resolution  of  constitutional  issues  is  not
"necessary"  in a strict sense;  the case  has already been decided by  a lower
court, whose judgment the Court need not review. 7° Instead, the Court  ac-
cepts jurisdiction based on  its assessment of the public  interest in having a
particular issue decided at the highest level. The  Supreme Court sometimes
decides  cases on broad bases, which are not required to resolve the particu-
lar dispute before  it, to  give guidance  to  other courts  in other cases. 7'  In-
deed,  some  doctrines  require  lower  courts  to  decide  issues  not  strictly
necessary  to determine  the rights  of the parties before  them. For example,
in qualified  immunity cases,  the district courts first pronounce  on whether
the plaintiff has  asserted  a  cognizable  constitutional  right  at  all,  and  only
then ask whether that right was sufficiently "clearly  established" to support
a damages recovery.'72 As I also pointed out above, courts could sometimes
avoid pronouncing  on  whether  a disputed right exists  if they were  permit-
ted to rule that, even if an asserted  right did exist, it was  not clearly estab-
lished at the time of the alleged violation. 3
By  no  means  do these  tensions  arise solely  from  recent  doctrinal  in-
novations. As I have noted already, the tension between Marbury's private-
rights  and  special-functions  faces  emerges  from  even  a  cursory reflection
on Marbury itself. In  one part of the opinion,  Chief Justice  Marshall  sug-
gested  that  the  Court's  authority  to  resolve  constitutional  issues  derived
solely  from  the necessity  of adjudicating  claims  of individual  rights.'74  In
other parts of the opinion, however,  Marshall uttered a number of constitu-
tional conclusions,  such as the amenability of the secretary of state to judi-
cial  process'75  and  the necessity  of a remedy  for  every  legal  right,'76 that
were  in no way  necessary to the ultimate holding that the Court lacked ju-
risdiction to decide the case.
It  is  equally  plain that  Marbury's private-rights  face,  which  suggests
that  it  would  be  "treason  to  the  constitution"'77  for  a  court  to  fail  to
170.  See supra text accompanying notes  100-03.
171.  See supra text accompanying notes  103-04.
172.  See County of Sacramento  v.  Lewis,  523  U.S.  833,  841  n.5  (1998)  (asserting  that "the  better
approach  is  to  determine  the  right  before  determining  whether  it  was  previously  established  with
clarity").
173.  See supra text accompanying notes  114-16.
174.  Marbury  v.  Madison,  5 U.S.  (I  Cranch)  137,  170  (1803)  ("The  province  of the  court  is,
solely, to decide on the rights of individuals ...  .
175.  See id.  at 169-73.
176.  Id. at  163.
177.  Cohens v. Virginia,  19 U.S. (6  Wheat.)  264, 404 (1821)  (Marshall,  C.J.).
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vindicate a valid claim of constitutional right in' a case properly before it, 7'
contradicts  its  political  or prudential  face,  which  counsels  avoidance  of
rulings  that  would  provoke  threatening  confrontations  with  the  political
branches. Constitutional thought and doctrine reflect this conflict. Showing
the  influence  of the private-rights  face,  various  doctrines  acknowledge  a
judicial obligation to resolve all properly presented issues  necessary to the
decision of  justiciable  cases.'79  Similarly, the notion that courts must vindi-
cate  rights  even,  and  perhaps  especially,  in  the face  of majoritarian pres-
sures  is  widely  celebrated.18 ° Yet  the  Supreme  Court points  explicitly  to
prudence  as  a justification for judicial  doctrines  denying  standing in cases
in  which  the  Constitution  would  allow  standing.'8'  Moreover,  despite  a
general judicial  reluctance  to rest decisions  openly on  political  or pruden-
tial  considerations,  commentators  have  plausibly  identified  a  number  of
Supreme  Court decisions  that are  difficult to  explain  except  in prudential
terms.'82  There  is  also  evidence  tending  to  support  claims  that  courts,  at
least occasionally,  manipulate  doctrine in  order  to achieve  affirmative  re-
sults that  they believe prudent or desirable.'83 This practice plainly  contra-
dicts  the  mandate  of  the  private-rights  face,  which  holds  that  "[t]he
province  of  the  court  is,  solely,  to  decide  on  the  rights  of
individuals  ... 184
Just  as Marbury's private-rights  face  wars  with  its special-functions
and prudential faces, the special-functions  and prudential faces are  often at
odds  with  each  other.  According  to  the  special-functions  model,  it  is the
constitutional  mission  and  obligation  of  the  judicial  branch  to  declare
178.  See supra text accompanying  notes 47-48.
179.  See supra text accompanying  notes 84-88.
180.  The most famous  reference  point  for this view is United  States  v. Carolene  Prods.  Co., 304
U.S.  144,  153 n.4  (1938)  (observing that courts may need  to  be especially searching  in their  review of
legislation  reflecting  "prejudice  against  discrete  and  insular  minorities ...  which  tends  seriously  to
curtail  the operation of those political processes  ordinarily to  be relied upon to protect  minorities). See
also Chambers v. Florida,  309 U.S.  227, 241  (1940)  (asserting  that courts  act "as  havens of refuge  for
those  who might otherwise  suffer because  they are  helpless, weak,  outnumbered,  or because  they  are
nonconforming  victims  of prejudice  and public  excitement");  Klarman, supra note  151,  at  1 (noting
that "[i]t  is common wisdom that  a fundamental purpose of judicial review is  to protect minority rights
from majoritarian overreaching").
181.  See supra text accompanying  notes 129-133.
182.  See supra text accompanying  notes 138-156.
183.  For example, Duke Power Co. v.  Carolina  Envtl. Study Group, Inc.,  438  U.S.  59 (1978),  in
which  the  Court  overcame  a  variety  of  justiciability  obstacles  on  the  way  to  upholding  the
constitutionality of a federal  statute crucial to the development  of nuclear power, is often cited as a case
in which  the  Court engaged  in  doctrinal  manipulation  in order  to achieve  a  substantive result  that it
believed  prudent.  See,  e.g.,  FALLON  ET  AL.,  supra note  5,  at  150  (terming  Duke Power "virtually
impossible  to  reconcile  with  prior  authority"  and  characterizing  it  as  "most  plausibly  explained  as
responsive  to  ad hoc considerations-especially  the desire  to reverse on  the merits  the district court's
ruling  that  an  important  federal  statute  was  unconstitutional");  Jonathan  D.  Varat,  Variable
Justiciability  and the Duke Power Case, 58 TEX.  L. REV.  273 (1980)  (citing Duke Power as an instance
of "variable justiciability").
184.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,  170 (1803).
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constitutional  norms  and  enforce  them  against  the  political  branches.'85
This injunction  is  difficult, if not impossible,  to square  with the prudential
counsel  that  courts  should  sometimes  avoid  the  articulation  of constitu-
tional norms in order to avoid collisions with majority sentiments.  The ten-
sion  becomes  more  acute  in  light  of  the  justification  for  the  special-
functions  model:  Courts  are  the governmental  institution best designed  to
grasp and  articulate  the true,  sometimes  exacting,  import of constitutional
norms.  Once  again,  Marbury  itself  illustrates  the  conflict.  Whereas
Marbury's special-functions  face  assumes  that  the judiciary  must  decide
constitutional  issues to ensure  that constitutional  decisions are untainted by
politics,  the  surrounding  facts-which  give  the case  its prudential  face-
suggest that the Court itself functioned as a prudent political actor.'86
IV
STRATEGIES  FOR MAKING  SENSE  OF DISSONANCE
As I explained  in the Introduction,  for those with an  internal perspec-
tive  on  constitutional  practice,  awareness  of  the  conflict  generated  by
Marbury's three faces  tends  to produce  cognitive  dissonance.'87 Most pro-
ponents of conventional  constitutional  arguments, which  purport to derive
conclusions  from  doctrinal  premises,  are  likely  to  presuppose  the  mutual
consistency of constitutional rules,  doctrines, and precedents,  at least much
of the  time.'88 When  that presupposition  is  directly  challenged,  the theory
of cognitive  dissonance predicts  that insiders  to constitutional practice will
pursue  a strategy  for restoring harmony among their beliefs about constitu-
tional  law or for explaining  coherently how  to carry on with constitutional
argument despite revealed  tensions  among foundational  premises.'89  There
are undoubtedly  myriad ways of coming  to terms with tensions  or contra-
dictions  in  constitutional  doctrine.  Here  I  shall  sketch  only  a  handful  of
strategies, perhaps idiosyncratically  denominated  as interpretivism, reform-
ism,  historicism, realism,  and  postmodernism.  As  embodied  in my  some-
what stylized  models  or  ideal  types,  all  of these  strategies  at  least  loosely
reflect prominent  strands  in the literature  on constitutional  law and theory,
even  if  my  accounts  do  not  precisely  describe  the  views  of  particular
185.  See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
186.  See supra text accompanying notes 74-75
187.  See supra  text accompanying notes 7-11.
188.  See,  e.g.,  KENNEDY,  supra note  13,  at  180  (asserting  that judges,  "and  their  informed
audience,  'deny,'  in the psychological sense of the word, the influence  of ideology" on adjudication and
that they  do so  in order  to avoid  needing to confront  contractions in "the  role constraints  under which
judges  operate");  Scordato,  supra  note  9,  at  389 ("[L]aw  students  frequently  carry with  them into  class
powerful  assumptions  about  the  coherence,  rationality,  and  substantiveness  of  legal  rules  and  legal
doctrine.").
189.  See generally Balkin, supra note 6, at 146 (describing how people apply "various strategies of
cognitive dissonance  reduction"  in dealing with beliefs or suggestions that  legal  norms  are incoherent
or unfair).
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thinkers. 9 °  In addition,  each  of the  five  strategies  represents  a  plausible
response  to  the  specific  doctrinal  tensions  traceable  to  Marbury, even
though not all have been specifically applied to Marbury and its three faces
in the extant literature.'9
The  fundamental  goal  of each  strategy  is to reconcile  or explain  doc-
trinal  tensions  in a  way that  enables participants  in constitutional  practice
to sustain a coherent,  facilitative understanding of what they  and others do
in  offering  constitutional  arguments.  The  standards  for  assessing  these
strategies  include requirements of intellectual  rigor, but they are also partly
psychological  and  thus  variable  from person  to person:  Approaches  that
produce  a sense  of understanding  and  empowerment  in  some people may
fail  to  do  so in  others. Although the range  of possible  strategies  is  vast if
not limitless,  it is  not surprising  that a handful  should predominate  at  any
particular time. The most prominent  strategies  are exhibited  in law school
teaching  and surrounding  literatures, and adherents provide mutual encour-
agement and support. 1 92
A.  The Nature of the Challenge
In attempting  to  fathom  the challenge  that doctrinal  tension poses,  it
may help to press harder on a notion to which I have appealed already, that
190.  As  introduced  by Max  Weber,  ideal  types  are  intellectual  constructs  developed  through  a
synthesis  of  familiar  positions.  See  MAX  WEBER,  ECONOMY  AND  SOCIETY:  AN  OUTLINE  OF
INTERPRETIVE  SOCIOLOGY  19-22  (Guenther  Roth &  Claus Wittich eds.,  1978). Although  based on  real
phenomena,  ideal  types exhibit  a possibly oversimplified  "conceptual  purity" that "cannot be  found  in
reality."  CARL  G.  HEMPEL,  ASPECTS  OF  SCIENTIFIC  EXPLANATION  156  (1965).  Ideal  types  can  be
approached  or approximated,  however, and "concrete  phenomena can..,  be compared  for the  purpose
of explicating some of their significant components." Id.
191.  There  is admittedly  no  magic  in  the  number  five.  My  selections  reflect  an  impressionistic
sense  that  the  five  identified  strategies  are  the  ones  most  commonly  deployed  by  commentators,
lawyers,  and law students  to meet the  intellectual  and psychological  challenges  that doctrinal  tensions
or  contradictions  create  for "insiders"  to  constitutional  discourse.  But  I  could  also  have  discussed
"pragmatism"  or  "neopragmatism"  of the  kind recently championed  by Judge  Posner.  See infra note
267  (distinguishing  Posner's pragmatism from postmodemism).  Critical race  theory would  be another
candidate  for  discussion.  See,  e.g.,  CRITICAL  RACE  THEORY:  KEY  WRITINGS  THAT  FORMED  THE
MOVEMENT  (Kimberle  W. Crenshaw  et al.  eds.,  1996); CRITICAL  RACE  THEORY:  THE CUTTING  EDGE
(Richard  Delgado & Jean  Stefancic eds.,  2d ed.  1999). The problem is that there is  no obvious stopping
point;  any distinctive  approach to  legal analysis  would be a plausible  candidate  for discussion.  Rather
than attempting to compile the most exhaustive  possible catalogue,  I have  identified  the five  strategies
that  seem to  me to  be the  most prominent and drawn a line on grounds that I  acknowledge to be largely
impressionistic.
192.  Those  who  predominantly  follow  a  particular  strategy  are  thus  analogous  to what  Stanley
Fish calls "interpretive  communities,"  defined  by characteristic  assumptions,  values, and outlooks  that
determine their  reading  of both  literary  and legal  tests. See  STANLEY  FISH,  Is  THERE  A TEXT  IN  THIS
CLASS?  13-14 (1980);  Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation  in Law and Literature,
60  TEX.  L.  REV.  551,  552  (1982).  For  purposes  of  constitutional  law,  Fish  writes,  the  different
interpretive  communities  are  defined  by  their  inclinations  "to  ask  different  questions,  to  consider
different bodies of information  as sources of evidence, to regard  different lines of inquiry as relevant or
irrelevant,  and, finally,  to reach  different  determinations of what  the  Constitution  'plainly'  means."
Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN.  L. REV.  1325,  1336 (1984).CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
of an "internal point of view" on constitutional  argument. 9 3 It is possible to
distinguish stronger and weaker interpretations  of what it  means to hold an
internal  point of view.  In  a strong  version,  an internal  point of view pre-
supposes  the  capacity  of  constitutional  doctrines  to  function  as  both
evaluative  and  prescriptive  norms. 1 9 4  Adherence  to  this  position  is  socio-
logically  and psychologically  familiar.  Some people believe  that constitu-
tional  law  would be  a  fraud,  and participation  in constitutional  argument
personally dishonest,  if such  argument  pervasively  reflected  opportunisti-
cally selected  premises  and embodied demonstrable  fallacies' 95 -as  would
be the case if legal doctrine abounded in contradictions from which nothing
could be validly proven. For someone with this sense of the coherence nec-
essary to support an internal point of view, a strategy  for dealing with doc-
trinal tension or apparent contradiction  could succeed  only by discovering
or creating an actual harmony within existing constitutional  law.
In a weaker interpretation,  however, the internal  point of view is sim-
ply  that of a participant  in constitutional  argument,  as  distinguished  from
that of an  outside observer.' 9 6  After  perhaps being  initially  startled by  ap-
parent contradictions  in  constitutional  doctrine,  some  people  may  realize,
whether  consciously  or subconsciously,  that the  acknowledgment  of doc-
trinal contradiction  fits relatively  comfortably  into their overall  scheme  of
beliefs.  As I noted above, a belief that the law is  tension-ridden  or contra-
dictory may cohere with and tend to support a settled political view that the
law  is unfair.'97  Similarly, those  who regard life  as generally rife with con-
tradiction  and irony may easily assimilate the view that the law,  too, abun-
dantly  displays these features.  People with attitudes  such  as  these are less
likely  to  feel  a  personal  stake  in  the  overall  coherence  of constitutional
193.  See supra  note 6 and accompanying  text.
194.  This  version  is suggested,  but not entailed, by  the initial  formulation  of the "internal  aspect"
of legal rules offered  in HART, supra note 6, at  56. Hart asserts  that the  "internal  aspect"  necessary for
rules to exist within a community or practice
is  that there should  be a critical reflective attitude to certain patterns  of behavior as  a common
standard, and that this should display itself in criticism (including self-criticism),  demands for
conformity,  and  in  acknowledgments  that  such  criticism  and  demands  are justified,  all  of
which  find their  characteristic  expression  in  the normative  terminology  of "ought",  "must",
and "should", "right"  and "wrong".
Id.
195.  See generally KENNEDY,  supra note  13,  at  192-212  (describing  "denial"  as a  characteristic
psychological response of judges who apprehend that  their role requires  them to make political choices
of a kind that their role  also appears  to forbid them to make).
196.  Cf  Balkin,  supra note  6,  at  128  (noting  that  "there  can  be  more  than  one  'internal
perspective'  reflecting  the  diverse  purposes  of different  people  in  seeking  to  understand  how  legal
rules function  as "norms  for conduct").
197.  See supra  text accompanying  note  15.
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norms than are those with stronger predispositions to regard legal norms as
both action-guiding  and morally justified.9'
For  such  skeptical  or  critical  participants  in  constitutional  practice,
there  is  less psychological imperative  to discover or establish  doctrinal co-
herence than to understand to what extent constitutional practice is or is not
conflict-ridden,  manipulative,  and  so  forth.  If constitutional  doctrine  and
argument  do  not  determine  conclusions  in  the  way  that  they  seemingly
purport to do, perhaps the appropriate emphasis  is on the "seemingly."  On
this  view, the  advocate  of a  constitutional  argument  is  no  more  morally
committed  to believing its truth than stage actors  are committed to believ-
ing their lines.'99
In presenting  a series of strategies  for dealing with perceived tensions
at the  foundations  of constitutional  law,  I  mean to  offer  at  least  partially
sympathetic portraits. Each  of the strategies  described below  has forceful,
intellectually  sophisticated  proponents. None  lacks allure. Yet  each  of the
strategies  is  only  that;  there  are  no  guarantees  of success.  Furthermore,
none  of the  strategies  for  dealing  with tensions  in  constitutional  thought
and  doctrine  is  capable of generating  a  constitutional  theory that satisfies
all  of the  criteria  that  every  participant  in  constitutional  argument  might
reasonably  uphold.
The  reason  that each  strategy  falls  short  of universal  acceptance  fol-
lows from the nature of the diverse yet overlapping challenges to which the
apprehension  of doctrinal  tension  gives  rise.  Some  of the  challenges  are
cognitive:  We aspire to understand the meaning of legal  doctrines partly in
order to understand how  they should  be applied correctly;...  giving up  too
soon  on the  search for  coherence  is  to abandon  the aspiration  to  doctrinal
mastery.  We also aspire  to understand  constitutional  practice  in terms that
can be reconciled with the teachings of the humanities  and social  sciences.
Other  challenges  are  less  cognitive  and  more  pressingly  practical  or
instrumental.  These  arise from felt needs for guidance about how to go  on
successfully  in  constitutional  practice,  in  one  or  another  of the  ways  in
which  success  might  be  measured.  Partly  overlapping  the  practical  chal-
lenges are  moral  ones. As  I have  noted already,  some  would regard  it as
dishonest  and  hypocritical  to  engage  in  a  conflict-ridden  constitutional
practice  that is  incapable  of supporting valid  arguments. 20'  In the view of
198.  Cf  Balkin,  supra  note  6,  at  146,  152  (noting that  some  people's  sense of self-identity  is
implicated  in  their understandings of the  legal system  and that  they thus have  an "ontological  stake"  in
its coherence).
199.  Cf  ARTHUR  ISAK  APPLBAUM,  ETHICS  FOR  ADVERSARIES  104-09  (1999)  (examining  the
question of whether lawyers  are "liars"  and, more  generally, when role-based  efforts to deceive should
be deemed morally acceptable).
200.  See Balkin, supra note 6, at  151  ("When we attempt to understand legal  norms so that we can
apply them to specific situations,  we must begin  with the presumption  that they  make sense-that  they
represent  an intelligible  and defensible scheme of regulation.").
201.  See supra  text accompanying  note 195.
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others, however, to  achieve  and articulate  too  sympathetic  an understand-
ing  of legal  doctrine,  in which  seeming  contradictions  are  explained  away
and immanent harmony revealed, would be to implicate oneself in discred-
itable apologetics.2"2
Besides  being  diverse,  these  challenges  are  refracted  through  the
complex  and varied psychologies  of individual  human  beings.  Each of us
approaches  constitutional  practice  with a  different  set of attitudes  and  be-
liefs  with which our understanding  of constitutional  doctrine  must be rec-
onciled." 3 In addition, different people have different reasonable  demands
and  purposes,"'  and they assign  different  priorities  even  to  shared  pur-
poses. Under these circumstances,  a theory or perspective that satisfies the
most  urgent  intellectual,  practical,  and  psychological  needs  of some  will
predictably fail to answer the most pressing demands of others.
B.  The Strategies  Explained
1.  Interpretivism
Among the deepest assumptions of traditional legal analysis  is that the
law,  no matter how jumbled  or contradictory  it may  appear on the surface,
in fact reflects  immanent,  logically  consistent principles  of justice.0 '  This
assumption  receives  its most profound defense  in the jurisprudential  writ-
ings  of  Ronald  Dworkin," 6   from  whom  I  derive  the  term
"interpretivism."2 7  But the label  "doctrinalism"  might  as  easily apply,  for
the  assumption of immanent  order also  marks what  Richard Posner  terms
"doctrinal"  scholarship.0 ' Doctrinalists,  as he defines them, try  to identify
202.  Cf  Balkin,  supra note  6,  at  164  (describing  the  pressures  that  can  lead  to the  moral  "co-
optation" of law students who "turn all [their] efforts to the task of  understanding  the law and to forging
an agreement  between [their]  own views and those"  immanent in the body of law that they are striving
to understand).
203.  Id. at  146 (applying  the theory of  cognitive dissonance to conclude that "[p]eople  will have  a
need  to  alter  their  beliefs  about  the  legal  system ...  only  if  their  beliefs  about  the  coherence  or
incoherence of legal norms produce a  significant conflict with their other commitments..
204.  See id.  at  128-29. Balkin asserts:
Consider  five different  purposes  for  understanding  the  law.  First, we  may  wish  merely  to
make  sense  of the  law  as a coherent  scheme  of regulation in  order to  learn  it  or  apply it.
Second, we may want to predict what  other  legal  actors  will  do.  Third,  we  may  wish  to
describe the law in  order to persuade  others to  interpret the  law in  our favor. Fourth, we  may
offer a critical portrait of the existing law  in the hope of persuading others to change the law.
Fifth, we may wish  to  understand law in terms of its practical effects rather than  in terms of
the content of  its doctrines.
Id.
205.  See id. at  154-56 (explaining how the understanding and application of  legal  doctrine requires
"rational  reconstruction").
206.  See, e.g.,  DWORKIN, supra note 6;  RONALD DWORKIN,  TAKING RIGHTS  SERIOUSLY  (1977).
207.  Dworkin  characterizes  law  as an "interpretive  concept,"  DWORKIN,  supra note 6,  at  87,  and
argues  that  lawyers  must  develop  "interpretive"  theories  both  of legal  practice  as  a whole  and  of
particular bodies of doctrine. See id. at 87-94.
208.  See  RICHARD  A. POSNER,  OVERCOMING  LAW 83-84 (1995).  Posner asserts:
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"patterns  in the cases  or,  failing  that, to impose"  patterns  of their  own.
2
01
Likewise, lawyers'  briefs  and judicial opinions characteristically  purport to
identify  an underlying  coherence  among  legal  rules,  principles,  and  poli-
cies, revealing the single, legally correct  answer to even the most contested
questions.10
The  assumption that  an immanent order  lies beneath  the  surface  ten-
sions of legal doctrine  is, of course,  only an assumption. No hidden god of
law  guarantees  that  coherence  will obtain;"'1  seekers  of legal  truth  cannot
expect simply to find an intelligible  order in the way that an archaeologist
might  find  a  lost  artifact.  Rather,  the  student,  scholar, judge,  or  lawyer
must use imagination and sometimes moral judgment to develop  the "best"
understanding of relevant  legal materials. 2 2  Normally, the best understand-
ing will be one  that explains  how statements  that appear  contradictory  on
their faces  can be reconciled as presenting the different rules  appropriately
applicable to different kinds of cases.2 1 3
Confronted with the dissonance generated by Marbury, an interpretiv-
ist would begin with the working assumption that the case's three  faces do
not contradict  one  another, but rather reflect  principles that have  different
weights  or apply to different types of cases.  For example,  an interpretivist
might start with the private-rights  face and the proposition that courts have
to vindicate  individual  rights  in cases properly before  them. In order to be
reconciled  with  Marbury's prudential  face,  the  duty  to  vindicate  private
rights  would need  to be  cast  as  a  principle,  not  an inviolable  rule.214  To
mark  the  boundary  indicating  when  that  principle  properly  yields  to
The traditional  law professor is above all a student of legal  doctrine. What he does, mainly, in
a legal  system  such as that of the United  States which is oriented toward  case law is  to read
judicial  opinions and  try to find the pattern  in the cases or, failing that, to impose one of his
own. Doctrinalists  are law's Talmudists.  They  proceed  from  the  welter of particular  cases.
The theory that guides  their  inquiry is muted,  tacit, traditional.  When  they make  arguments
for reform  they  make  them  from  within the  tradition,  using  fragments  of ethical  or  policy
analysis found in the cases.
Id.
209.  Id. at 83.
210.  See  Smith,  supra note  13,  at  1042  (noting  that  lawyers  characterize  the  law  as  yielding
"univocal conclusions").
211.  Cf Pierre  Schlag, Law as the Continuation  of God by Other Means, 85  CALIF.  L.  REV.  427
(1997)  (arguing  that  arguments  purporting  to  establish  legal  objectivity  and  determinism  resemble
attempted  fallacious proofs of the existence of God).
212.  See DWORKIN,  supra note 6,  at 256-57  (asserting that a judge "must  choose between eligible
interpretations  by  asking  which  shows  the  community's  structure  of institutions  and  decisions-its
public standards as a whole-in a better light from the standpoint of political  morality" and must depict
the  public  "political  record  [as]  the  best  it  can  be overall");  Richard  H.  Fallon,  Jr.,  A  Constructivist
Coherence  Theory  of  Constitutional Interpretation, 100  HARV.  L.  REV.  1189,  1231-37  (1987)
(defending a similar approach).
213.  See  Balkin, supra note  6,  at  154-56  (describing  the  process of "rational  reconstruction"  of
legal doctrine).
214.  Cf Fallon &  Meltzer, supra note  84,  at  1787-91  (casting  Marbury's apparent  promise  of a
remedy  for  every  legal  right  as  a  "principle,"  not  a  "command,"  that  can  sometimes  yield  to  the
competing  policies reflected in doctrines of sovereign and official immunity).
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prudentialism,  an  interpretivist  would  attend  to  the  case  law,  seeking  an
account  that  would  fit  it  tolerably  well. 215  But  moral judgment  could  be
required too. For example,  an interpretivist  might, but need not,  prefer an
explanation  that limited  prudentialism  to  exceptional  cases-for instance,
those  in  which  a judicial  effort  to  enforce  private  rights  would trigger  a
backlash,  not merely against  the  courts, but against  the very  persons and
interests that the courts would otherwise be obliged to protect. 216
If Marbury's private-rights  and prudential  faces  could be  reconciled,
an  interpretivist  would  also  attempt  to  specify  when  the  courts  properly
perform  special  functions  beyond  the  vindication  of  traditional  private
rights. For example,  a theorist might identify a defensible judicial tendency
to  adopt  a  special-functions  approach  when, but  only when,  the  most af-
fected parties would  be unable  to assert their own rights," 1 7 or the integrity
of the political  or judicial  process  would  otherwise  be at risk,2"'  or  other
criteria are  satisfied.
Having  thus  illustrated  how  an  interpretivist  might  attempt  to  deal
with Marbury's three  faces, I emphasize  that I do not mean to endorse  the
sketchy  account that I just offered.  I have intended  only to model  a possi-
ble,  familiar,  indeed  traditional  legal  response  to  dissonance  in  constitu-
tional doctrine,  Neither, however,  should I distance myself too  much. Most
of my  own  work  reflects  an  interpretivist  perspective,"9  partly  because  I
find  it temperamentally  congenial  and  partly,  especially  in  my  teaching,
because  it reflects the form of arguments made  in briefs and  other submis-
sions to courts. Within  the prevailing norms of legal practice,  an effective
argument to a court must purport to demonstrate  that the law, correctly un-
derstood, yields  a preferred result.
Although  my own affinity for interpretivism  is strong,  and although it
models the characteristic  approach  of most doctrinal analysts  and of many
more  philosophical  commentators, 22 °  experience  makes  plain  that  an
215.  See  DWORKIN,  supra note 6, at 255 (discussing the requirement  that a good  legal theory  must
fit the extant  materials at least tolerably well).
216.  See SUNSTEIN,  supra  note  166,  at  161-62  (arguing that courts  should not declare and enforce
rights under such circumstances).
217.  The Supreme  Court has often  cited this as a  consideration  in  upholding third-party  standing.
See,  e.g.,  Griswold  v.  Connecticut,  381  U.S.  479, 481  (1965)  (allowing  a doctor to assert the  rights  of
married  couples  to  utilize  contraceptives  because  "the  rights of husband and  wife,  pressed  here, are
likely  to  be diluted  or  adversely  affected  unless those  rights  are considered  in  a  suit involving  those
who  have this kind of confidential  relation  to them");  NAACP  v. Alabama,  357 U.S.  449, 459  (1958)
(permitting  an  assertion  of  third-party  rights  "where  constitutional  rights  of  persons  who  are  not
immediately  before  the  Court  could  not  be  effectively  vindicated  except  through  an  appropriate
representative before the Court").
218.  See, e.g.,  Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991)  (upholding standing  of a criminal defendant  to
assert  that the  prosecution  had used  peremptory  challenges  to exclude jurors  of a  race  other than  his
own, even though the right being asserted was  that of prospective jurors).
219.  See, e.g.,  Fallon, supra note 212, at 1231-37  (defending a similar approach).
220.  See supra  text accompanying notes 205-10.
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interpretivist  perspective will not satisfy everyone.  People who believe  the
prevailing  regime  to be  substantially  unjust  often regard  the  interpretivist
strategy  as  a  form  of apologetics  that  would  put  them  at  risk of  moral
"co-optation. ''221  Because  interpretivism  demands  a  sympathetic  recon-
struction of existing doctrine22 2  or an effort to portray  it in  the best moral
light, 223 it may have the insidious effect of muting criticism. For those with
strongly  critical  attitudes  toward  the  prevailing  constitutional  order,  the
interpretivist perspective  may  thus appear uncongenial,  if not psychologi-
cally-impossible. 224
Some also believe that interpretivist  approaches  tend to yield mislead-
ingly idealized accounts of constitutional  adjudication  as a search  for prin-
cipled  coherence  among  legal  authorities.2 25   For  them,  interpretivist
accounts  are  difficult  to  reconcile  with  beliefs,  which  they  believe  to be
founded  in human  psychology  and supported  by  the teachings of political
science,226  that judges  tend  to  decide  cases  based  more  on  their  personal
values  than  on  legal  doctrine.2 27  However  this  criticism  is judged,  it  is
surely  true  that  interpretivist  theories  are  not  designed  to  yield  rigorous,
testable  predictions  of judicial  behavior. 22 8  For  anyone  whose  principal
221.  See Balkin,  supra note 6,  at  160-61  (asserting  that  the  quest  for interpretive  understanding
"entails  a quest  for agreement  with what  we  interpret"  and  "may  result ...  in  our  co-optation"); see
also  ROBERTO  MANGABEIRA,  THE  CRITICAL  LEGAL  STUDIES  MOVEMENT  119  (1986)  (deriding  an
approach  to legal analysis that "restate[s]  power and preconception  as right").
222.  See Balkin, supra note 6, at  154-56.
223.  DWORKIN,  supra  note  6,  at 256-57.
224.  See Balkin, supra note  6,  at  146 ("[l]f an  individual  has  an ontological stake in  believing in
the  fundamental  incoherence (or the  fundamental  injustice)  of the  legal  and political system,  she will
tend to find unresolved  moral conflicts and contradictions  in various parts of the law  because belief in
their coherence might conflict with  her precommitments.").
225.  See,  e.g.,  Michael  Wells,  Rhetoric and Reality  in  the Law of Federal Courts. Professor
Fallon's Faulty Premise, 6  CONST.  COMMENT.  367,  376-77  &  n.20  (1989)  (expressing  doubt  that
judges  are  "deeply  committed  to  principles  of structure  and  judicial  role"  and  opining  that  "raw
ideology" exerts a greater influence).
226.  Some political scientists believe  that the Supreme Court  pervasively pursues a policy agenda.
See,  e.g.,  JEFFREY  A.  SEGAL  &  HAROLD  J.  SPAETH,  THE  SUPREME  COURT  AND  THE  ATTITUDINAL
MODEL  17,  62-73  (1993)  (developing  a  testable  "attitudinal  model"  according  to which judges  and
Justices  decide cases based solely on their ideological values and criticizing nontestable,  nonpredictive
approaches);  Lee  Epstein  et al.,  The Supreme Court as a  Strategic National  Policymaker, 50  EMORY
L.J. 583,  592-95  (2001)  (hypothesizing that  the Justices  are "single-minded  seekers of legal policy" but
that  they will temper  their decisions, for strategic  reasons,  to "avoid  reaching decisions  considerably
outside  the  range  acceptable  to  the  legislature  and  the  president").  Most  legal  scholars  reject  this
position, see, e.g.,  STEPHEN M.  GRIFFIN,  AMERICAN  CONSTITUTIONALISM:  FROM  THEORY  TO POLITICS
138  (1996),  as  do  many  political  scientists,  see  Keith  Whittington,  Taking  what  They  Give
Us.'  Explaining the Supreme Court's  Federalism Offensive, 51  DUKE  L.J. 477, 485  (2001)  (describing
views of a "new  institutionalist" school).
227.  See, e.g.,  Michael  Wells, Naked Politics,  Federal Courts Law, and the Canon of Acceptable
Arguments, 47 EMORY  L.J. 89,  110-24 (1998)  (arguing that "naked  politics is ubiquitous" in the shaping
of federal courts'  doctrine).
228.  See Richard  H.  Fallon, Jr.,  Comparing  Federal  Courts "Paradigms",  12  CONST.  COMMENT.
3,  12 (1995)  (noting that the aim of certain types of legal scholarship is "not  to predict outcomes,  but to
suggest, invoke, and elucidate some of the norms that help to  constitute legal argument").
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interest  lies  in predicting how judges  will decide cases,  especially  in ten-
sion-ridden  doctrinal  areas,  the  interpretivist  perspective  will  therefore
seem inadequate.
2.  Reformism
Like  interpretivism,  reformism  aspires  to  establish  the  kind of doc-
trinal harmony necessary  to support a strong version of the internal point of
view,  under  which  doctrinal  norms  are  action-guiding  and  furnish  valid
premises  for constitutional  arguments.  Whereas  interpretivism  seeks to ra-
tionalize  the overwhelming  preponderance  of existing  constitutional  doc-
trine,  reformism,  which  is  a  close  cousin,  acknowledges  tension  and
contradiction  that  cannot  be  resolved by  mere  interpretation.  Instead,  re-
formism proposes to eliminate  current tensions by retaining those doctrinal
strands that  reflect what  the would-be  reformer regards  as  the law's  most
normatively attractive  values and by purging others.
An example of reformism comes from Owen Fiss's article,  The Forms
of Justice, which  offers  a  sustained  defense  of adjudication  pursuant  to
Marbury's special-functions  face. 229  "[T]he  function  of the judge,"  Fiss
writes,  "is  not to  resolve  disputes, but  to give  the  proper meaning  to  our
public  values." 23  In asserting that various justiciability  and equitable  doc-
trines should be organized around this premise,  Fiss does not deny the exis-
tence  of competing  doctrinal  strands.  On  the contrary,  he recognizes  that
his preferred approach conflicts with precedents reflecting what he terms a
"dispute-resolution  model."23' But instead  of trying to establish a harmony
in which each  competitor has  a proper place,  Fiss argues  that the  special-
functions  approach,  to  use  my terminology,232  should be  preferred. 233  He
offers no suggestions as  to how  cases reflecting  a  contrary position might
be  distinguished. Operating at a remove  from  interpretivist argument,  Fiss
urges  major reforms.234  Prudentialism appears  to  have no place  in his  vi-
sion.
229.  See Fiss, supra  note 57.
230.  Id. at 30.
231.  Id. at  17.
232.  Fiss characterizes  "the mode  of constitutional  adjudication"  that  he champions  as "structural
reform,"  which  he  depicts  as  "distinguished  by  the  constitutional  character  of  the  public  values
[involved],  and even  more  importantly, by  the fact  that it involves  an encounter between the judiciary
and the state bureaucracies."  Id.  at 2.
233.  See  id. at  28-44  (rejecting  arguments  for  the  primacy  of a  dispute-resolution  model  and
asserting  reasons  to prefer  a  vision of the judicial  role more  receptive  to public-rights  litigation  and
structural reform).
234.  Interestingly, Fiss  casts himself as defending  a revolution  in  legal  doctrine  already wrought
by  Brown  v.  Board  of  Education,  347  U.S.  483  (1954),  and  successor  cases  against  a
"counterrevolution"  by  the  Burger  Court.  See  Fiss,  supra note  57,  at  5. But  Fiss's notion  that  his
preferred vision of the role of the courts had already triumphed and had only recently come under threat
is untenable  in  light of the deep influence  of Marbury's private-rights  face.  See FALLON ET  AL.,  supra
note  5,  at  83  ("The  Supreme  Court  has  never  explicitly  embraced  the  public-rights  [or  special-
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Fiss's argument is not, of course, the only possible reformist approach
to the tensions  generated  by Marbury's three faces.  Whereas Fiss  champi-
ons  a  conception  of the judicial  function that  reflects Marbury's special-
functions face, it would be equally possible for a reformer  to prefer the pri-
vate-rights  model.  For example,  Justice  Scalia has  suggested that  standing
doctrine  should  be organized  on this  exclusive  basis. 235  Or, conversely,  a
reformer  might  conclude  that  Marbury's private-rights  face  reflects  intel-
lectual  naivetd:  A  sound  legal  system  must  attend  carefully  to  conse-
quences  both  in  defining rights  and in  providing for  their enforcement." 6
To  a  reformer proceeding  in this mode,  Marbury's prudential  face  might
illustrate  the  need  for  a  pragmatic  approach  to  law 237  more  attentive  to
practical  consequences than to logical consistency.
Without rehearsing  the disclaimers that followed my attempt to model
an interpretivist  approach,  I would say  only that reformism,  like interpre-
tivism,  should  not  be  expected  to  satisfy  the  demands  of everyone  who
adopts an internal  perspective on constitutional  law.  For anyone who must
engage in doctrinal discourse under conventions that require the acceptance
of entrenched  authority  and who  feels  personally  implicated  in  endorsing
the validity of the premises from which her arguments  proceed, there  is no
relief from  the  cognitive  dissonance  generated  by  doctrinal  tension.  Re-
formism does not so much deny the existence of conflict at the foundations
of constitutional  law  as  attempt  to  avoid  it by  focusing  on  what the  law
ought  to be, not on what  it  is. Nor, in  the eyes  of those  satisfied with  an
interpretivist  approach,  is  there  any  need to  reject the  strategy  of seeking
doctrinal reconciliation  in favor of more explicit reformism.  In yet another
reasonable view, reformism fails to answer the sensible demand that a per-
spective on doctrinal  tension should not only  generate  a true  empirical  ac-
count of the  state  of the  law, but  also  support  testable predictions  about
how judges will decide cases in instances of actual or apparent conflict-a
concern to which reformism does not speak at all.
3.  Historicism
A third response to tension in constitutional  thought and doctrine  is  to
return  to  historical  sources  and  attempt  to  resolve  the  disharmony
through  enhanced  historical  understanding.  Present-day  participants  in
functions]  model  of the  judicial  rule  or disavowed  the  dispute  resolution  [or private-rights]  model.
Indeed,  its formal pronouncements  have been consistently  to the contrary.").
235.  Scalia, supra note  90,  at  881-85  (arguing  for  revisions  of standing  doctrine  to  reflect the
"traditional  requirement  that  the  plaintiff's  alleged  injury  be  a  particularized  one"  and  tracing  his
preferred "traditional"  approach to Marbury).
236.  See  generally  Louis  KAPLOW  &  STEVEN  SHAVELL,  FAIRNESS  VERSUS  WELFARE  225-75
(2002) (emphasizing the importance  of costs and benefits  in designing  optimal legal  procedures).
237.  The  leading champion  of legal pragmatism is Judge  Posner. See, e.g.,  RICHARD  A.  POSNER,
THE  PROBLEMATICS  OF  MORAL  AND  LEGAL  THEORY  227-310.(1999)  (defining  and  defending  a
pragmatic theory of law).
2003]CALIFORNIA LA W REVIEW
constitutional discourse  view Marbury, like the statutory and constitutional
texts that Marbury interpreted,  across  a  broadening  temporal  and  cultural
gulf. 238 Reading  the texts through the lens of modem assumptions,  influen-
tial  commentators  have  concluded  that John  Marshall  must have  engaged
in  willful  manipulation  of the  1789  Judiciary  Act  to  facilitate  a  political
strategy. 239 But perhaps their view is mistaken.
A  recent  article  by  James  Pfander  illustrates  the  possibility  that
Marbury's seeming  contradictions  might  arise  from  objective  historical
misunderstanding. 24  Based  on  extensive  research,  Pfander concludes  that
John Marshall  interpreted the  1789 Judiciary Act correctly.24' According  to
Pfander,  it  was  generally  understood  during  the  founding  era  that
"supreme"  courts  possessed  a  supervisory  authority,  to  be  exercised
through  writs  of  mandamus,  over  governmental  officers  and  lower
courts. 42  When  this  background  understanding  is  taken  into  account,
Pfander  argues,  it becomes  plain  that the  1789 Judiciary  Act  "confer[red]
precisely  the  sort  of  freestanding  power  on  the  Court  that  Marshall
attributed to it  in Marbury. ' 243 Building on this foundation,  a constitutional
historian  could imaginably  conclude  that Marbury included  no political or
prudential  aspect  at all.244  If so,  one  source of tension  in  Marbury would
disappear.
Historical  inquiries  could  conceivably  purge  other  tensions  as  well.
For example,  one could imagine  research purporting  to demonstrate that in
light of the historical  context, Marbury should be understood  as committed
exclusively  to a private-rights  approach  to constitutional  adjudication,245 or
238.  See  generally  Lawrence  Lessig,  Fidelity  in  Translation,  71  TEx.  L.  REV.  1165  (1993)
(emphasizing  the cultural gap between  the contemporary  world and that of the founders  and  noting the
resulting problems  in achieving constitutional understanding).
239.  See supra text accompanying  notes 69-74.
240.  See Pfander, supra note 69.
241.  See id.  at  1535.
242.  See id. at l518.
243.  Id  at  1535.  Pfander  also  argues  that  previous  commentators  on  Marbury have  looked  at  a
subtly  but  significantly  different  version  of  the  statute  from  the  one  that  Marshall  almost  surely
consulted,  with the latter being much more consonant with Marshall's  interpretation. See supra note 70.
244.  Although  Pfander does  not  reach this conclusion,  Robert  Clinton  does.  See  CLINTON,  supra
note 74.
245.  The Supreme Court appears to have assumed  that its dominant,  though perhaps not exclusive,
limitation of  standing  to those  who  have  suffered  distinct and  palpable  injuries  reflects  the  original
constitutional  understanding.  See, e.g.,  FEC  v. Akins,  524  U.S.  11,  24  (1998)  (asserting that  a merely
abstract "harm-for  example,  injury to  the interest  in seeing  that the  law is  obeyed-deprives  the case
of the concrete  specificity that characterized  those controversies  which  were  'the  traditional concern  of
the  courts  at  Westminster"'  (quoting  Coleman  v.  Miller,  307  U.S.  433,  460  (1939)  (Frankfurter,  J.,
dissenting))  and  that alone  should  therefore  be regarded  as  properly justiciable  today);  Valley  Forge
Christian  Coll.  v.  Citizens  United  for  Separation  of  Church  &  State,  454  U.S.  464,  476  (1982)
(asserting  that  standing  limitations  are "part  of the basic  charter  promulgated  by  the  Framers  of the
Constitution  at  Philadelphia  in  1787").  Scholars,  however,  have  predominantly  rejected  the  Court's
assumption.  See,  e.g.,  Richard  Pierce,  Is  Standing  Law or Politics?, 77  N.C.  L.  REv.  1741,  1765
(reviewing  historical studies  and concluding  that  "no  historical  support  exists  for  the proposition  that
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perhaps to  a historically  grounded  but now forgotten  approach  that coher-
ently  embodies  some but not  all aspects  of the private-rights  and  special-
functions models.246 If a project of this kind rendered Marbury wholly self-
consistent, then the historical truth would contain no disturbing dissonance,
and subsequent misunderstandings could be characterized  as simple errors.
In offering these  comments on the possible -fruits of historical inquir-
ies, I do  not pretend  to judge Pfander's  conclusions  about the best reading
of the  1789 Judiciary  Act. Neither do  I mean to project the success or fail-
ure of similar historical inquiries of the kind that I have sketched.  I would
insist, however, that the historicist project, as I have described it, could not
imaginably  satisfy  the concerns  of everyone  who is  unsettled by  apparent
contradictions  in current constitutional  doctrines.
Even  if successful  in its  own terms,  historicism  could not purge  ten-
sions  from  contemporary  doctrine  except  on  the  contestable  assumption
that historical  truths uniquely  determine  current legal  meaning and  consti-
tutional  validity.  Full  implementation  of this  assumption  would have  dra-
conian effects  unlikely  to be acceptable  to anyone.  In  a closely  analogous
case  that  much  influences  my  modeling  of  historicism,  self-styled
"originalists"  believe  that  constitutional  interpretation  should  in principle
reflect  the "original understanding"  of relevant  constitutional provisions.247
Nevertheless,  nearly all originalists  accept that at least some mistaken deci-
sions must now be accepted on the basis of stare  decisis.2 4 8  For those adopt-
ing  this  approach,  originalism  is  not a  complete  constitutional  theory,  for
its implementation  requires  the development  of a normative theory of stare
decisis.249
Article  Ill  imposes  limits on the types  of plaintiffs that can  obtain access  to federal courts");  Robert J.
Pushaw,  Jr.,  Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A  Neo-Federalist Approach,  81  CORNELL  L.
REV.  393,  477  (1996)  (concluding  that  the  Court  has not provided  historical  support  for  its  view  of
standing).
246.  See  e.g.,  Pushaw,  supra note  245,  at  451-52,  479-80  (sketching  a "neo-Federalist"  theory
under which courts  have  a duty  to exercise  all jurisdiction  conferred  by Congress, the  Constitution,  or
the common  law and arguing  that  when Marbury is  set in  historical context,  it becomes  clear that the
Court  contemplated  lawsuits  not  rooted  in  private  injuries  but  "necessary  to  uphold  the  Supreme
Constitution against inconsistent  legislation");  cf Raoul  Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is
It  a  Constitutional Requirement?,  78  YALE  L.J.  816,  827  (1969)  (maintaining  that  when  the
Constitution was adopted, "the  English practice  in prohibition, certiorari,  quo warranto,  and informers'
and relators'  actions encouraged  strangers to attack unauthorized  action").
247.  See, e.g.,  RAOUL  BERGER,  FEDERALISM:  THE  FOUNDERS'  DESIGN  15-17 (1987);  ROBERT  H.
BORK,  THE  TEMPTING  OF  AMERICA:  THE  POLITICAL  SEDUCTION  OF  THE  LAW  143-46  (1990);
ANTONIN  SCALIA,  A  MATTER  OF  INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL  COURTS  AND.THE  LAW  38-47  (1997)
[hereinafter  A  MATTER  OF  INTERPRETATION];  Antonin  Scalia,  Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57  U.
CIN.  L.  REV.  849,  862  (1989);  Clarence  Thomas, Judging, 45  KAN.  L.  REV.  1, 6-7  (1996).  For  a
historiography  of originalism,  see  Barry  Friedman  & Scott  B.  Smith,  The  Sedimentary Constitution,
147 U. PENN. L.  REV.  1, 11-33 (1999).
248.  See,  e.g.,  W.  Lynn  Creamery,  Inc.  v.  Healy,  512  U.S.  186,  209-10  (1994)  (Scalia,  J.,
concurring);  Am.  Trucking  Ass'ns  v.  Smith,  496  U.S.  167,  204-05  (1990)  (Scalia,  J.,  concurring);-
BORK, supra note 247, at  155-58;  SCALIA,  A MATTER  OF INTERPRETATION,  supra note 247, at  138-40.
249.  See FALLON,  supra  note  159, at  15-24.
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The  same  would  almost  surely  be  true of historicism,  as  I have  de-
fined  it.  If, however, the  current  constitutional  validity  of bodies  of doc-
trine developed in reliance  (or mis-reliance)  on Marbury's three faces does
not  depend  entirely  on  the  historical  Marbury's animating  assumptions,
then historicism cannot by  itself resolve  all tension and apparent contradic-
tion in constitutional  doctrine. To some, it may give comfort to believe that
the tensions  afflicting  constitutional  doctrine result  from  interpretive  mis-
takes, not foundational  decisions. To others,  however, the salient point will
be  that  perceived  tensions  in  current  doctrine  continue  to  exist  and,  for
some,  may  continue  to  generate  cognitive  dissonance.  For  those  whose
sense of cognitive  dissonance  remains, historicism will  fail  to satisfy a ba-
sic  desideratum  for  an  approach  to  perceived  doctrinal  tensions.  Nor,  of
course,  does  historicism  answer the  demands of those  who believe  that  a
perspective on tensions in constitutional  doctrine should yield predictively
valid accounts of how judges actually decide cases.
4.  Realism
Realism, as I shall use the term, is a perspective concerned  solely with
achieving  a true, empirical  account of how judges decide  cases,  especially
in light  of perceived  tensions  in  legal  doctrine.  When  the  term  is used in
this familiar way, rather than to describe the historical Realist movement  of
the  1920s and  1930s, "realist"  theories contend that judges decide cases  on
the basis  of their personal  values,  largely  without  regard  to  legal  rules. 250
The  most  uncompromising  realist  position,  asserting  that  constitutional
norms  and legal  doctrines  have no  motivational  force,  seems  psychologi-
cally  and  sociologically  implausible. 2 5'  A  more  tenable version  holds  that
judges  decide  cases  based  on  values  or  ideology  when  conflicting  legal
250.  This  usage  reflects  what  Brian  Leiter  characterizes  as  "the  Received  View"  of  legal
realism:  "Legal  Realism  is  fundamentally:  (1)  a  descriptive  theory  of  the  nature  of  the  judicial
decision, according to which,  (2)  judges exercise unfettered  personal discretion,  in order  (3)  to reach
results  based  on  their personal  tastes and  values,  which  (4)  they  then  rationalize  after-the-fact with
appropriate  legal  rules and  reasons."  Brian  Leiter,  Rethinking Legal Realism:  Toward a Naturalized
Jurisprudence,  76 TEX.  L.  REV. 267, 268 (1996).
I use this definition  because  it appears to  be the  understanding  of realism that  has predominantly
influenced  current participants  in  constitutional  debates, notwithstanding  forceful  arguments  that  this
definition  fails accurately  to reflect the uniting elements in  the classic  realist writings  of the  1920s  and
1930s.  See, e.g.,  MORTON  J.  HORWITZ,  THE  TRANSFORMATION  OF AMERICAN  LAW  1870-1960,  at  170
(1992)  (arguing  that "above  all, Realism  is  a continuation  of the  Progressive  attack on  the attempt  of
late  nineteenth  century Classical  Legal  Thought to create  a sharp  distinction  between law and politics
and  to  portray  law  as  neutral,  natural,  and  apolitical");  Leiter,  supra  at  274-75  (defining  the
jurisprudence  of the historical realists  as marked by philosophical  commitments  to "naturalism,"  which
stipulates  that a satisfactory  theory  of adjudication must flow  from empirical  inquiry, and pragmatism,
which insists that a satisfactory  theory must permit successful predictions of what courts will do).
251.  See GRIFFIN,  supra note 226,  at  138  ("Most  political  scientists  and legal  scholars...  agree
that justices ..  attempt to follow the law in good  faith."); see also Whittington, supra note 226, at 485
(describing  a "new  institutionalist"  school  of political  scientists  who  assume  that  "the  law matters  to
judicial behavior").
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norms,  such  as  those reflected  in Marbury, render  the  doctrine  indetermi-
nate.25 2
In the literature  on constitutional  law and  federal  courts  law, various
writers  have  adopted  largely  realist  perspectives,  notably  with  respect to
the standing and justiciability  doctrines that Marbury has inspired and that
its faces  continue  to influence.
253 For example,  Richard Pierce  has written
that lawyers
can  predict  judicial  decisions  in  [the  standing]  area  with  much
greater  accuracy  if they  ignore  doctrine  and  rely  entirely  on  a
simple description  of the law  of standing that is  rooted in political
science:  judges  provide  access  to  the  courts  to  individuals  who
seek to further the political and ideological agendas of judges. 254
Among  its  attractions,  realism  aspires  relentlessly  to  intellectual  honesty
and mocks fraud and pretense. Realism responds directly to the purposes of
those  concerned  principally  with  predicting judicial  decisions.  It  also  co-
heres  well with familiar and partly cynical beliefs about human motivation,
which  draw some support from social scientific  literature. 5  Upon embrac-
ing realism,  some appear to  feel a thrill of liberation and an empowerment
to  act  strategically  in  the  service  of aims  unrelated  to  doctrinal  coher-
ence. 6 But realism  fails to  address  a number of other demands that  doc-
trinal tension and cognitive dissonance  may reasonably  spawn.
Defined as a purely empirical  theory, realism offers no guidance  con-
cerning  what  a judge,  lawyer,  or concerned  citizen  ought to  do. 257  Con-
fronted  with  doctrinal  tension  that  threatens  to  undermine  faith  in  the
possibility  of coherent  constitutional  discourse,  a  participant  in  constitu-
tional practice  might reasonably test a perspective  by its capacity  to gener-
ate  practical  guidance,  such  as  that  furnished  by  interpretivism  and
reformism.  Nor  does  realism  speak  to  the  question,  which  is  urgent  for
many, whether judges  have  legal  obligations, including  obligations  of the
kind identified  by interpretivist  theories.  What  lawyers  and judges  have a
constitutional  obligation  to  do  is  at  least  partly  independent  of what  is
sometimes,  or even  frequently,  done.  A perspective  that sheds  no light on
questions of legal  obligation is not everyone's  cup of tea, nor could purely
252.  Cf Leiter, supra  note  250, at 296 (noting that the classical realists  "do  not claim that  the law
is  'globally'  indeterminate,"  but  rather  that  it  is  "so  'locally,'  i.e.,  in  a  particular  range  of  cases,
particularly  those that reach the stage of appellate  review").
253.  See,  e.g.,  Pierce,  supra note  245;  Mark  V.  Tushnet,  The New Law of Standing: A  Plea for
Abandonment, 62  CORNELL  L.  REV.  663  (1977);  Michael  Lewis  Wells,  The  Impact of Substantive
Interests on the Law of  Federal  Courts, 30 WM.  & MARY L. REV. 499, 531-34  (1989).
254.  Pierce, supra  note 245, at  1742-43.
255.  See supra text accompanying notes 226-27.
256.  See,  e.g.,  Wells,  Who's Afraid of Henry Hart?, 14  CONST.  COMMENT.  175,  204-05  (1997)
(arguing  that realism's  acknowledgement  of the  power  of "substance"  in  influencing  jurisdictional
determinations would  generate "a  more sophisticated understanding  and a more penetrating analysis").
257.  For a classic  statement of this argument,  see HART, supra note 6, at 10-11,  132-44.
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intellectual  argument ever make  it so.  There  may  also be a  strong psycho-
logical impetus  to resist realism.  For  some, participation  in constitutional
practice  would  be  alienating  and  repugnant  if they  could  not maintain  a
strong version  of the internal point of view, from which constitutional  law
appears  as  a  genuine  source  of evaluative  and  prescriptive  norms.  Real-
ism's cynical acids threaten to erode the necessary  foundations  for a strong
version of the internal perspective.
5.  Postmodernism
In contrast  with  the  perspectives  that  I have  discussed  so  far,  post-
modernism is  not distinctively a  strategy for understanding  law, but a gen-
eral  intellectual  outlook that can  be applied  to  law. There  is  no canonical
definition of postmodernism, and the appropriate definition and its applica-
tions are much contested. 258 I shall use the term in a loose sense embracing
two  separable  strands  of thought.  The  first,  poststructuralism,  "tends  to
emphasize the role of language  and of language's underlying  structures  in
shaping our understanding  of reality  and texts." ' 259 Poststructuralists  main-
tain  that texts  are  internally  unstable,  susceptible  of alternative  and  often
contradictory  meanings.  To  readers  or observers,  one  meaning may  seem
clearly correct. If so, poststructuralists see this result as more attributable to
social  pressures  or  cultural  conditioning  than  to  the  texts  themselves. 26 °
They  portray  the  practices  through  which  meanings  are  assigned  and
claims of knowledge  validated as  activities "infused with social  interaction
and power."26' What is  more,  they insist that there  is no escaping  the field
of influence.  Poststructuralism  depicts  "the  [human]  individual  not as  the
subject in control of discourse, but as an artifact produced by discourse." ' 262
258.  See  GARY  MINDA,  POSTMODERN  LEGAL  MOVEMENTS:  LAW  AND  JURISPRUDENCE  AT
CENTURY'S  END  2  (1995)  ("Postmodemism  is  an  elusive  term  not  easily  defined  or  captured  by
standard  dictionaries  or  interpretive  strategies.").  As  Minda  notes,  the  effort  to  capture  the
postmodernist position  in stable propositional terms is  in one sense  doomed to failure, since the essence
of the position is in some sense  to deny the "modemist"  assumption  that there are objectively knowable
foundational  truths  capable  of stable  statement  in  propositional  form.  See  id. at  190.  It is,  however,
possible to identify claims that self-styled postmodemists commonly assert.
259.  Peter  C.  Schanck,  Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for Statutory
Interpretation,  65 S. CAL.  L.  REV.  2505, 2514 (1992).
260.  MINDA,  supra  note 258,  at 233 ("Postmodems understand  truth and knowledge as contingent
social  constructions,  incapable  of  being  grasped  by  a  fixed,  determinate  theory  or  conceptual
construct.").
261.  See  J. M.  Balkin,  What Is Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90  MICH.  L.  REV.  1966,  1972
(1992).
262.  Dennis  Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law,  77 CORNELL  L. REV.  254, 276  (1992);  see
also James Boyle, Is Subjectivity Possible? The Postmodern Subject in Legal Theory, 62  U.  COLO.  L.
REV.  489,  521  (1991)  (characterizing  the  postmodern  theory  of the  "self'  as  one  in  which  "'I'  am
merely the  place where  things happen"). See generally Pierre  Schlag,  The Problem of the Subject, 69
TEX.  L. REV.  1627 (1991)  (exploring  difficulties in attempting to give a stable meaning to the notion of
"the subject"  in contemporary jurisprudence).
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A second strand in postmodernist  discourse  seeks  to characterize  dis-
tinctive  features  of the  contemporary  world  through  comparisons  with  a
predecessor "modem"  era. 263  Examining the implications for constitutional
law, Jack Balkin describes the postmodern  age as one of "mass culture and
mediazation,  "264  of "fragmentation,  diffusion,  [and]  emphasis  on surface
(as  opposed  to  substance  or as  substance  itself). '65  Other  commentators
have attempted  to explain  how  current  literature,  architecture,  and  art  are
influenced by distinctive trends in world or national politics or popular cul-
ture. 266
Prominent among features  tending to unite  these two strands  of post-
modernist  thought 267  is  an  embrace  of  irony.  As  Gary  Minda  writes,
"postmodemism  is  a  condition,  an  aesthetic,  an  intellectual  style  that
recognizes  and  embraces  the contradictions  and paradoxes  it discovers  in
traditional  conditions,  aesthetics,  and  intellectual  styles. 2 68 According  to
James Boyle, "postmodemism  suggests that the best [source of insight] one
could hope for is ironic juxtaposition.  "269
Marbury lends  itself  readily  to  postmodernist  analysis:  As  a  text,
Marbury is  multi-faceted  and  unstable,  reflecting  at  least  three  faces.  If
agreement  could  ever  be  reached  on  its  meaning,  or  even  its  dominant
meaning,  that agreement  would be  culturally contingent.  In contemporary
society, it is hardly  surprising that there  should  be an  unstable division  of
views, as case-by-case  impulses exert divergent pulls.
Marbury also abounds  in irony:  Though it is the foundational  case for
the notion that the Constitution creates  rights removed from politics,  it was
itself a  deeply political  decision."'  Though  Marbury famously proclaims
263.  See  ANDREAS  HUYSSEN,  AFTER  THE  GREAT  DIVIDE:  MODERNISM,  MASS  CULTURE,
POSTMODERNISM  183  (1986)  (emphasizing  postmodemism's  temporal  "relational  nature");  MINDA,
supra note  258,  at 226  ("Postmodems  say that  we  are  now living  in  the postmodern condition...,  a
time that entails new conditions and requires new techniques of investigation.").
264.  Balkin, supra note 261,  at  1968.
265.  Id. at 1969.
266.  See,  e.g.,  HUYSSEN,  supra note  263,  at  183-99  (describing  postmodernist  approaches  to
literary criticism, architecture,  and art in the  1960s,  1970s, and  1980s).
267.  By defining  postmodemism  in terms  of these  two  strands,  I have  excluded  "neopragmatist"
thought, which some commentators  also group under  the postmodemist  rubric. See Schanck, supra  note
259,  at 2514-15;  cf  MINDA,  supra note  258,  at  229-30  (terming neopragmatism  "a  close  cousin"  of
postmodemism).  Although  there  are  affinities  between  poststructuralism  and  some  strands  of
neopragmatism,  perhaps  the  leading neopragmatist  legal  writer  is Richard  Posner,  see, e.g.,  POSNER,
supra note  237,  whose  empiricism  and devotion  to  economic  analysis  seem  radically dissonant  with
poststructuralism.  The  kind of legal  neopragmatism  championed  by Posner  certainly  numbers  among
the available  responses  to  the tensions  in legal  doctrine, but it  should  be defined  and evaluated  in its
own terms, not squeezed  under the same rubric with poststructuralism. As  I acknowledged  at the outset,
the range of possible responses  to doctrinal tension  is vast. Not pretending to analyze or even catalogue
all actual or possible  theoretical  approaches, I leave extended discussion  of neopragmatism  for another
day.
268.  MINDA,  supra  note 258, at 2.
269.  Boyle, supra  note 262, at 503.
270.  See supra  text accompanying  notes 69-76.
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that for  every  right  there must  be  a remedy,  William  Marbury  may  have
had no remedy, despite having a vested legal  right.27I Though Marbury as-
serts  that the judicial  role  is  solely to  determine  the rights of individuals,
the  opinion  furnishes  several  important  rulings  irrelevant  to the  ultimate
decision that the Court lacked jurisdiction to vindicate  William Marbury's
claim to relief. 272
Beyond Marbury, I have little  doubt that postmodernism aptly charac-
terizes some people's experience of constitutional  law and of life generally.
It is  also apparent  that  some  students,  lawyers,  and  law professors  delight
in the subversive claims and ironic juxtapositions of poststructuralism  and
feel empowered by postmodernists'  insights into contemporary  culture and
legal  practice.  Rather  clearly,  however,  postmodernism  is  too  discordant
with many people's  general experience  of life and views about knowledge
to  be  a  psychologically  plausible  option  for  everyone.  Postmodernism
holds  no  promise  of establishing  doctrinal  coherence  for  those  who  are
troubled  by  tensions.  Nor  can  it  generate  normative  prescriptions  about
how  to proceed.  Indeed,  poststructuralism  pervasively  tends  to  destabilize
the  premises  that normative  argument  requires. 273 In  short, although  post-
modernism may  satisfy the purposes and  psychological needs  of some, its
approach to doctrinal tension just as clearly fails to satisfy what I take to be
the reasonable demands of others.
271.  Although  Marbury  v.  Madison  held  only  that  the  Supreme  Court  could  not  exercise
jurisdiction  in  the original  action  before  it,  it  is not clear that  any  court could  and would  have  given
Marbury  the mandamus  relief that  he sought.  A state court could not have  issued a writ  of mandamus
commanding  action  by the  U.S.  Secretary of State. See McClung v.  Silliman,  19 U.S.  (6  Wheat.)  598
(1821)  (holding that  a state  court lacked jurisdiction of a  suit for mandamus  against a federal  official).
Nor  did the  federal  district  courts  and  circuit courts  possess  mandamus  jurisdiction  under  the  1789
Judiciary  Act. See Mclntire v.  Wood,  11  U.S.  (7  Cranch)  504  (1813).  In Kendall v. United States,  37
U.S. (12  Pet.)  524 (1838),  the Supreme Court held that the territorial courts of the District of Columbia,
apparently  alone  among the courts  of the  nation, were empowered  to issue writs of mandamus  against
federal  officials.  Kendall came  thirty-five  years after Marbury, however, and  it seems  highly doubtful
that  the Court,  in  the  politically  charged  atmosphere of 1803,  would  have  upheld the  authority of the
D.C.  courts  to  order mandamus  relief for William  Marbury  against  James  Madison.  Cf  ELLIS,  supra
note 20, at 67  (noting "indications"  that Marshall  "had serious  doubts  about the political expediency  of
hearing  the  motion  [in Marbury] in  the  first  place"  and  asserting  that  his  "main  concern  ...  was  to
avoid  a direct  confrontation  with the  executive  department").  In any  event, Marbury  appears  to have
abandoned  efforts  to secure  his commission  following  the Supreme  Court's decision. See BEVERIDGE,
supra  note 25, at  125 (reporting that by the time of the Court's ruling, "the term  had almost half expired
for  which  Marbury and  his associates  had been  appointed,"  and "these  appointees  must  have  lost all
interest  in the contest for offices of such slight dignity and insignificant  emoluments").
272.  See supra text accompanying notes 60-61.
273.  See Pierre  Schlag,  Normative and Nowhere  to Go,  43  STAN.  L.  REV.  167,  173-75  (1992)
(attacking  normative  legal  thought as pervasively  based  on  untenable  assumptions).  I do  not mean  to
suggest  that  all  postmodemists-.or  even  all  poststructuralists-are  psychologically  disabled  from
feeling  and  acting  on  normative  commitments.  Cf  RICHARD  RORTY,  CONTINGENCY,  IRONY,  AND
SOLIDARITY  189  (1989)  ("[A]  belief can  still  regulate  action,  can  still  be  thought  worth  dying  for,
among  people  who  are  quite  aware  that  this  belief  is  caused  by  nothing  deeper  than  contingent
historical circumstance.").  My  point is  only that poststructuralism denies  the  possibility of objectively
valid reasoning from determinate  moral premises to uniquely correct conclusions.MARBURY AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL MIND
C.  Shifting Perspectives
In describing  five  strategies  for  dealing  with  tension  and  perceived
contradiction in constitutional  law, I have not meant to suggest that a selec-
tion is necessarily final  or irreducible. Taken  in their own terms, the strate-
gies attempt to establish different kinds of order or understanding. The type
of understanding yielded by one  of the perspectives  may  suffice  for some
purposes but not for  others. For example,  it is possible  to pursue  a realist
strategy  for purposes  of predicting  how judges  will  decide  cases,  but to
believe  that  constitutional  practice  is  defective  or  even  scandalous  in  its
present  state.  Someone  who  is  a  descriptive  and predictive  realist  might
thus adopt a reformist, or possibly historicist, perspective when considering
how current  doctrinal  tensions  ought  to  be  dissolved.  The  same  person,
when addressing  formal legal  arguments  to a court, might  deploy an inter-
pretivist strategy,  arguing or believing  that there  is a doctrinally  best way
to reconcile a particular apparent tension as a matter of law.
Because it is possible and indeed familiar for the same person to adopt
different  strategies  for dealing  with doctrinal tensions  at different times,  it
might be insisted that there are few if any pure interpretivists or realists, for
example,  but only people who  adopt an interpretivist  perspective  some of
the time and for some purposes, and people who sometimes pursue a realist
strategy,  and  so forth.  Even  if so,  however, participants  in  constitutional
discourse  commonly have a predominant  outlook or orientation  of the kind
reflected  in the interpretivist, reformist, historicist, realist, and postmodem-
ist  ideal types-as  is  suggested by the bodies of literature  on which  those
ideal  types  are  based.  Those  who  speak  from  these  different perspectives
often  disagree  with  each  other.  Insofar  as  they  disagree,  the  contestants
believe  that  the  insights yielded  by their strategies  are,  at  the  least, more
fundamental  and  illuminating  than  the  claims  generated  from  other  per-
spectives.  This phenomenon needs to be explained. My explanation  is that
familiar differences  in perspective often reflect different responses-rooted
partly  in variables  of individual  psychology  and belief structure-to  ten-
sion and perceived  contradiction  at the  foundations  of constitutional  doc-
trine.
V
CONCLUSION:  MARBURY's  LEGACY
In this Article  I have examined the challenges presented by tensions in
constitutional  doctrine  and  constitutional  thought.  Marbury v.  Madison
furnishes  the paradigm  case.  At the  foundation  of constitutional jurispru-
dence, Marbury exhibits three interesting, powerful, and conflicting  under-
standings  of the necessary  and appropriate judicial role. The decision has a
private-rights,  a special-functions,  and a political  or prudential face. These
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competing  faces  continue  to  influence,  and  indeed  to  generate,  constitu-
tional doctrine and thought.
Like  other  tensions  in  constitutional  doctrine,  Marbury's divergent
faces  create  cognitive  dissonance  for  many  participants  in  constitutional
practice.  Doctrinal  norms  and prescriptions present themselves  as  authori-
tative, but their validity depends on their mutual  consistency; contradictory
premises  for  constitutional  arguments  cannot  all  yield valid  conclusions.
Among  those  disposed  to  view  doctrinal  formulations  as  binding  norms,
the apprehension  of doctrinal  tension triggers  intellectual  processes aimed
at restoring  or establishing  coherence.  These  processes  have several  inter-
related aspects.  One aspect  involves  a  search for  objective  truth or mean-
ing.  To  grasp  the  meaning  of legal  doctrine  is  to  know  how  to  apply  it.
Because  unresolved  tension  makes  correct  application  impossible,  appre-
hension of tension  triggers  efforts  aimed  at resolution.  Another  aspect  of
the quest for  coherence  is  purposive.  People approach  constitutional  doc-
trine and practice  with a variety of purposes. These  include prediction and
persuasion,  as well as ordered understanding  of legal meaning.  The type of
coherent  understanding  that  suffices  for one  purpose  may  not suffice  for
others.  A  further  aspect of the  search  for  coherence  is  psychological,  as
illuminated  by the  theory  of cognitive  dissonance.  We  all  feel  a  psycho-
logical  imperative  to  bring  our  thoughts,  attitudes,  and  beliefs  into  har-
mony. But the harmony that we seek and the dissonance that we experience
do not involve  our beliefs about  law alone.  The  theory of cognitive  disso-
nance  teaches  that  we  strive  to  reconcile  our  beliefs  about  law  with  our
other beliefs and attitudes. According  to this theory, the tenability of views
about judicial practice and constitutional  doctrine will vary with particular
people's background beliefs about justice, human psychology, and so forth.
In response  to the challenges and the cognitive  dissonance  created by
apprehensions  of doctrinal  tension, various  strategies  are  available.  Inter-
pretivism is  a strategy for identifying a latent harmony within existing doc-
trine.  Reformism  acknowledges  current  disharmony  but  promises
reconciliation  through  normatively  preferred  reforms.  Historicism  aims to
discover  normative  consistency  in  the  historical  foundations  of constitu-
tional  law  and  to  explain  current  inconsistencies  as  the  residue  of subse-
quent mistakes.  At least two  other strategies,  realism  and postmodernism,
are  strategies  for learning to live with, and possibly find  liberation in, per-
ceived doctrinal inconsistency.
The  diversity  of strategies  provokes  the  question:  Which  is  best?  In
response, I have argued that none satisfies all of the criteria, some rooted in
individual  psychology,  that  a  reasonable  person  might  uphold.  Choice  is
likely to be determined more by individual purposes, intellectual  bent, and
temperament-as  shaped  by and  refracted  through  the  surrounding  socio-
logical  context-than  by  rationally  conclusive  argument.  The  wages  of
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doctrinal  tension are  diversity  and methodological  disagreement  in consti-
tutional law.
Marbury is  illustrative.  We  want  to  know  what  Marbury means  or
stands  for. Confronted  with  the  case's three  faces,  the student,  professor,
judge,  or  lawyer  adopts,  probably  subconsciously,  a  perspective  from
which  order can be imposed  or disorder  can be  explained  and disarmed-
perhaps  what I have  termed  an  interpretivist, reformist,  historicist, realist,
or postmodernist perspective.  Having made  sense of Marbury and its doc-
trinal  legacy  for  themselves,  participants  in  constitutional  practice  may
then seek to persuade  others. As I have emphasized, however, what consti-
tutes  the best  perspective  or  understanding  depends  partly  on  individual
purposes, partly  on psychology,  and partly  on varying  background beliefs
about a host of matters besides law.
In the  absence of a universally best  strategy  for  managing  perceived
conflict  in constitutional  law,  richness  and  diversity  are  the  glory  of the
constitutional  culture  that Marbury helps to structure. Apparent  contradic-
tion  and  methodological  disagreement  are  also,  perhaps  inevitably,  en-
demic to Marbury's legacy.
274
274.  Although  it  has been suggested  to  me that  this conclusion  is  distinctively "postmodemist,"  I
am inclined to regard this characterization  as misleading, though  not as flatly false. Much,  perhaps  all,
depends  on  how  the  term  "postmodemist"  is  used.  As  discussed  above,  I  understand  the  term
"postmodernism,"  as characteristically  used in the  legal  literature,  to embrace  two separable  strands  of
thought.  One  pursues  poststructuralist  analysis  of texts,  while  the  other  attempts  to  characterize  the
distinctive  features  of a  "postmodem"  era  in  contrast  with  a prior "modem"  period.  See supra notes
258-66  and accompanying  text.
Neither  my  analysis  in  this  Article  nor  the  conclusion  to  which  it  leads  is  in  any  way
poststructuralist. I have not claimed  that the meaning of all texts  is inherently conflicted or unstable.  On
the  contrary,  I have  attempted  to  give  a  coherent,  stable,  and  indeed  a true  account  of the  state  of
constitutional  doctrine  and  of  the  varied  predicaments  of participants  in  constitutional  practice.  I
believe  that  it  would  also  be  possible  to  identify  normatively  best  doctrinal  interpretations  and
normatively  best  approaches to doctrinal  reform,  though  to  do  so would  be a  large and daunting  task,
far  beyond  the  aim  of this  Article.  My  position  has  not been  that  all  claims  of normative  truth  are
inherently  conflicted,  unstable, or relative,  but that  not all efforts to understand  constitutional  law and
practice are efforts to identify what is normatively best.
Neither have I suggested, nor do I believe, that my  claims about Marbury  and its legacy depend  in
a deep way on peculiar features of contemporary culture or politics. If contemporary  doctrine is situated
in a "postmodem"  world-a characterization  that I am frankly  uncertain  whether to embrace-then  of
course the doctrine  that I describe is (tautologically)  a postmodern  phenomenon, as  is my  commentary.
But if all  contemporary  writing  is  temporally  postmodem,  then  the  label  lacks  power  to discriminate
among contemporary  works.  For the related term "postmodemist"  to  be illuminating,  it would  need to
refer  to  something  distinctive  in  perspective  or  approach  that  is  characteristic  of  the  so-called
postmodem  age.  Both  my analysis and my conclusion  emphasize  tensions,  recognize  a multiplicity  of
perspectives,  and portray both  legal doctrine  and human thought  as complex and sometimes conflicted.
If a  tendency  to  adopt  characterizations  such  as  these  by  itself  is  viewed  as  sufficient  to make  an
analysis "postmodemist,"  then the label  fairly applies  to this Article and its conclusion.  I am  inclined to
resist  the postmodernist characterization  because  I fear that it would mislead those who understand  the
rubric,  when  applied  to  legal  scholarship,  as  embracing  either poststructuralist  premises  or  a  broad
rejection  of the  epistemological  assumptions  of the  "modem"  era.  I understand  tension,  multiplicity,
and  complexity  as  part  of  the  truth  about  constitutional  law  and  the  human  condition-not  as
indications that there is  no truth, but only a range of inherently unstable perspectives.56  CALIFORNIA LAW RE VIEW  [Vol.  91:1